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Finding solutions to conflict of inter~:st situations 
is a never ending task., 'I'he ba.sic difficulty :revoJ.es around 
the fZ:-iCt situation J·. ,., .a 
another. What :m.ay be statutory r<:~lief for onE~, situation way 
not be relief for another. 'I'his paper attenpts to (:::2rnr•1i:ne 
the possibility of statutory relief and pre<:-;ents certain 
selected exau1pl.s~] of federal and state leV<3l legislation in 
the:;; confl:i.ct of interest. are,a. WE! be,gin with a 9eneral 
with an evalu<.:i:tion of certa.Ln. federal eind state responsH·2'a tc, 
conflict of interest situations. 
H.eco,;;ni:dng that it wculd be much too involved to 
p:cesent all fed~~ral conflict of ir:1t0rest. legislation and 
also a state-by-state analysis, I ha11e chosen to f'Jelect cc::r:-
tain. key federal legislation and certain i~<.~YJ.ple ·states whose 
conflict of i.nterest leg is la ti.on has been UDed as a rn-:.::;·~~"'~1 by 
Jerr:H3Y and M:i.nnegota ar~:-: cons.idexed by various studies .in 
tbs conflict area to 1121.ve th;;; most complete statutory :t'E:lief 
for conflict of interest. s:'<. tuntion;;. The selected states 
v 
also were chosen because of their gE::ographic loc.;;.tion and 
bf.;cause each of them has a some-what sirttilar approac~t to 4g;;1-
flict of .inh:rest.. I attf·}xrtpt to catogorizc~ different kinds 
of conflict si tuation.s a.nd proceed to presE;nt some selected 
legislation a.nd proposed legislation that is us6d to remE.;dy 
tb2se situatiorrn E<.t both the national and state level.s c~f 
govcr.nmento Research success has been somewhat elusive .in 
the sense that there are no clearly stated responses to 
"grsy-zone" conflict situations·~ However, we hc.-ITe di::>covered 
that the conflict situations, oncE:. defined, can be dealt with 
in v·arious ways and can be rE-m1edicd in most cases through 
sta.tutory or non-statutory relief. 
Preparing this paper has been a long and arduous task. 
Much has been written and said t~bout conflict of .interest. 
Through it all I have somehov-1 mainta.ined a sincere interest 
in the subject matter. I would like to Empress my thanks 
to all those who have helped me with this project. Only 
their generous assistance made this projc~ct pos.sible. 11 
speci.al thanks goes to Professor Arthur Gunlicks for in-·. 
spi.ring and sustalning my interest in the conflict of in~· 
Vi 
CBAPTER I 
!N1rRODUCTION 
.'?l. Standards of H<::"havior 
'l'he question of wrwt con:::d::.itutes appropriate behavior 
for government officials has long bee.n of grea.t intsrest to 
lawyers, persons in gcvernr:i.<::nt, a:r;.d political scientists o 
The essential issue is that of ascertaining what is the 
!i good behavior" that is expected of public s2r1:ants a.nd, in 
addition, what are appropriate standa.rds that can be used to 
evaluate thf::! performance of a public official in a si.tuatio:::. 
involving a conflict of interest. 
Conflict of interei.:it ho.s bec;;n defined in rn.any ways. 
The Uniteu States Supreme court defines tJonf lict of interc',:;;t 
or corruption in the following- way. •:conflict of interest 
involves an act of an official or fiduciary person who unlaw-
fully and wrong-fully uses his station or charactGr to procure 
soro.e benefit. for hi1m;;elf or for another person, contrary to 
duty and the righbJ of others. "1 r.:.lack 's La,w Dictiona.ry con-
---·----· ----
1 r1 "' J •.. .,., ~o~ "'<'....,, 682 {c• "" "l"" ..L . . 0 6"E) • 1woJ···~, ... ~,rr 
.,..) • !:i. 'ffo...{. OtJ.J.l.b •_j,J. T ./., ,,.)_f;' • -' ' "''. ~. i~J. \..:.. ,. .:I ' ,, j h 1 ~· i"...:,)l.J.·.:.4', .. i. 
v. Murchison, 66F. 719 (c .. c. Ga .. , 1934); U.S. Vo Edwards, 
43F.67 (o.c. Ga .. , 1961). 
tains a similar but so11\e'what briefer definition. n.l,s>.ck 
stat.es that conflict. of int.crest is an act done. wit:h. an intent 
to give some advantage iw:~onsi.st.\u1t with. official ilut.y a.nd 
the rights of others .. 2 Thefle defin.i.tions at:n:ve a.s tl basis 
for this discussion .. However, w~ mustrecog-niza,that there 
are various shades of conflict of i11tereat t.o wl1ich we :now 
turn our attention .. 
Wbat is the problem. of confli<::t of interest as it. 
affects goverm,lent? It embrao<~a th-t-:i behavior of public of ... 
ficials and. thdS concept of the 11 public i:nterest. .. M It is 
concerned. with whether of.Eicial behavior is consistent with 
cial *s conduct. of hi$ job in acoo:rd.fance with the broad in· ... 
tooth~ and behavior that i.s obviously irr,,proper and illegal, 
2nenry Campbell E~lack, Black• a J:raw' Dictiotu:rryi ih.~:f.i-· 
nitions of the TerxrtS lu1d J.?hx;ases of American and Fi:i9lish 
Jurisprudence 1mcchent. and Mod.ern (St .. Paul, Min.n .. ! Wt::i.st 
Publishina co •. 1968), 172. 
" . 
3Martin M.a.Mnllen, ~A Thoery of Corruption., ~ 
Soci.oloqical R~v:tew, :ex July (1971), 71 .. 
---·-"""""'"'"""'"""''"""""'·"""-...,.~""'"-~,.,.,.~ ...... ,. 
poaiti.en \ih$ro h:ia p11u.·aonal 01:- priva.t~ inter.aat.i~ ala. .. ~h with 
his pl.':lhlic dutiQ:si ood r~ap.o.t&:l"ii1ihiJ.1.t.ie5,. 4 It eru10~'.l:iaszit1s u. 
aaalin~ \ti th ecmt:lie·t. gf i:ntereHat <.leviitl.O};!IB in ~tten1p•ting to 
catalogue $Uch u9ray soni:~-. ~ctd.vit.ia~ as •p:copl!hrt!I or «im-
proi~ar• either g,;;ni11<rim:.tll)" al'.° in individual $i tuations (>, In 
r.tot..-m case a tb~ f intil.l decidin9 factor r,my h'st1lOl'i};.!il th4l oon• .. 
aci11.ni® of the decision""'l!~aker or the 9'encral tnii;lic., 
d~~1tal p~uwr.pt.ion of d~mooratic a.Iid res~)onsible .govern-
t.i@nt ... 5 !tit~ m:.lnaept of dan1oor~tto and responsible gow:ct1m~1mt 
pr(Susuppoi1S•~u~ that p~rsonu dealing with 9ovem·.rn.1;e;nt be treated 
e4XUa!.lly; that all l't'OS~estJ, in theol!}~ at l~Mt., ~~iual aooas$ 
t.o govorrn.ient; tha.t all il'.tt:o affordud equal h~1$.rings, rul<l 
that al.l rect~i ve deciaious .by g-ov1u:nmer1t based ~olely upon 
'*th~ mer.its" of a pnrt;.;ioular east!!. or, sill"tply, gOV'.l.~rt1mant: 
is not. t:xp.e-ct.ed tiQ sbo'll>r favo.:rit:l~un in t:t:·eating its ~iti2-en.f!f. 
4aia.rle·• P~ray, "~he CJ!'i~.bl of Public Trust. (United 
State.:s) ,• tiA<t,!~~~~f~:z!,t Mey# 1970, 32.,. 
pUblic s~.rvant~ maintain in th$ir r~a!;rect.ive putlio <;ztmz:-10:1 
with whici'1. we are <;oncorz'iiatL, 6 
$ui,·~portiiibl.e,. and lf. $0 1 tJt,t.ermines th~ ;>tmliB!Ui?.ant for t.'lt't 
offe.m:i~r aceo.rdi~9 t.o .l!;tatutori.1 pr<.lVi$ioiuh 
The .i.s!l.'l'ue of cm1flic.t of interest, however, uau.ally 
5 
reference to these situations, or if some reference is fou..,d 
there is such vagueness of langua.ge employed as to render a 
., 
statute virtually useless in aiding a court's judgment process .. ' 
This resultant situation of "indefiniteness" due to 
statutory, oirdssion or generality is not the sole factor com~ .. 
plicating tbe area of conflict of interest,. The.re are many 
other factors which comprise the compl~i:m environrr.ent in ·which 
remedies to conflicts of interest are sought., One of the 
most important of these is the way in which the game of poli-
tics is played. 'I1he functioning of the Atl'lerican political 
party system includes as basic components the phenomi:ma of 
patroni3.ge 1 campaign contributions, colt'.prise and the politi-
cal price of comproraise, as well as the building of bases of 
support among various organized groups in society. All of 
these have become integral parts of our party system, essen-
i 1 i f f 1 . t i t' B t a to the operat .• on o · success u par y organ za· 1ons .. 
Many of the situations forming phases of the conflict of 
interest }?roblem arise from these facets of party activity. 
While their r.>le in AL--rierican politics is not often questioned,. 
the growth of "conflict situations" from them presents the 
difficulty of drawin9 the line between practices that are 
acceptable and those that are not.. 'rho line itself must be 
...... ,,\ t 
7Paul H., Jl.ppleby, t!qrali ty and Administration in 
Democratic Goven1ment (New York: Macmiliian ·Company, I963), 23. 
a George A ... Graham, ~'lprf!.li ty .in l\lnerican. Poli tics 
(New York; Randorn. House, 1958); 86. 
J;'Xlint out, solut.io:n\S ~u~t be abroii.St of 1iJ~'lrarict1U1 soc:ial 1.iJ'td 
ethical eta.."ld~u:'d.41 if th~y ara to ~~ aucc-a~.rntul. 9 The corrv•" 
parntive inaction of l<:-agi~la:ti'l.~ bodios i~i dam.ling tJith th•s 
iu:abl..a~ i~l partially at:tributnblil!l t...'> thei1n d!fficultias. ~rn 
thill r~apact th!il facet'~ of <.:otd.:'lict of 1n-t.ermst.. are quite 
confusit11iif• !'or ~x~le, it 1.s ar~pa.rttmt t,hat the natua."e of 
tJ1ia problem is e~sent.ittliy t'U.ff~:rtnlt for i;;)::-t<rAcut.1.va v.nd 
lei;islati va of'ficiala. ~toat of the ftu:El;>.ar ar9 f ull ... tis~ 
ear;ir'lel." public ~Harva.11.'t~ who a:re iilreudy subj~l!ct to nua~rou$ 
l~ial strictur0a ?:>~cause ot t.h-~ir pubU.o (¥~1loyu~nt. sut 
thim groUJ:.) c~.tt ~1erlU\P$ btl dQ·~orih1ilid as being a~1ara of certain 
liit\i:t.•Rtion~ upon thttd.r h~havior when t:i.'l1t.k'.lrtakin<J nuch en:1p·li:l';/"" 
~nt. It. is: tb.¢1 pt'i;'Jl,J.ta1ta: of alection whic~1 stltL.ulat.ia11 tba 
neod f1';;>>; cam};)'~d.gn contributicu1tit, patrona.ga, .a-nd tlrot':lise$ 
1 
~xecut:.ive agencies"' there is tha :pro tilem of high nppointi ve 
officials. 10 One of t.,,11.e proble1r;s is the need to at.tract.,. an<! 
retain, proven executive talent foit c<::rn'.!Paratively brief 
periods of time from the bu~inoss world., 11 Those who stlrve 
9"0Ve:rnment. in th!s <ti>tay do so with the intent cf r~t.ur,ning 
eventually to th<.tir ncm-governwental po..~iti.ons. 12 Tht1s,, the 
i:mI~act of conflict le~islat.ic:n n11on this particular group in 
e~<l:cut.!v~ agencies must be ~€d.qbf!td carefully. 
!mot.her factor re5pon$l:ble for a cu1utioua. approacb. to 
the 1~:roh~m 1$ t.i1Q impact of oonfliot le9islation upon the 
tttocial group ,of govexn~.nt employees a11d offioialth 13 If 
b0h.avior limit.at.ions are le9'islated and prescribed,. tho 
11.aert~l M. Sparks, "Conflict of ,.,,hose inte<rest?"' 
{Co~ntint;i on cri ticisrl! of thG ~ppoi.nt.rtlent of sue~l}saful 
husinf\l.ss~n to n_; ublie off :tee, !Jr!f. t.ed Stat~s .. l Freemi:m, 
"' Wfllil'li' :st 
8 
question of their conformity to the qeneral behavior pattern 
of the group develops. If proposed limitations when strictly 
enforced are harsh and impracticable, then we may encounter 
the phenomenon of having them ignored in practice. 
Problems of constitutionality are also encountered in 
attempts to legislate remedies. Constitutional questions 
develop from the devotion of American government on all levels 
to the principle of •separation of powers." It is generally 
recognized that the facets of conflicts of interest vary 
among the three branches of government and that the legal 
remedies available to meet them differ in the case of each 
branch. It is also widely conceded that the problem must 
be approached and defined in separate and distinct frames 
of reference. Thus we employ within the framework of this 
paper reference to the following categories of persons who 
are publicly employeda 
l. Elected National Legislative (ENL) 
2. Elected Hational Executive (ENE) 
3. Appointed National Legislative (ANL) 
4. Appointed National Executive (ANE) 
s. Appointed National Judicial (ANJ) 
6. Elected State Legislative 
1. Elected State Executive 
a. Elected State Judicial 
9. Appointed State Legislative 
(ESL) 
(ESE) 
(ESJ) 
(ASL) 
10. Appointed State Bxeeutive 
11. Appointed State Judicial 
(ASE) 
(ASJ) 
Throughout. this paper wo will deal. with the above distinct. 
categories t'U\a the oontext of the presentation should clari• 
fy the use of the appropriate category. 
Bnforeenent schemos must of neoassity be distinct. 
fo~ ea.cb branoh.14 lt ls intet'esting, as well, to observe 
that peat: World trar Xl studies and legislation on the sub• 
3ect bavo confined their focua almost solely to the execu-
t.i ve an4 legislative branches of government an4 have not. 
sought. to pursue the problem among the judiciary.15 This 
omission however should. be rectified with the influx of 
studies on th• United Stat.ifUJ Supreme Court appointment 
There is also abuntlant legislation dealing with 
actions which may influence. the deo1siono of juri~• and jud-
~es, 16 aoat of which is strictly constnod and swiftly en• 
foroea. 17 Xn dealing with e•cutive offic::iala anct legisla-
tors, it is conceded. that barring the regulation of.behavior 
l4aantord Watnwi, Conflict of Interest.I Politics 
the Moruax Gmz:e (New York a cowies" liook l!o~, 1§7 J, 115. 
l 5oaniel Sell, •crime aa an American Way of! Life,• 
.l\.ntiooh. Review, (Summer 1953) XIII, 133. See also, A.A. 
Iioiaow and'.'a.,I>; Lasswell, Powarhcorruition and.ttoct.itide 
(ln9l•wood Cliffs, H.J. I -Pren. ce:..lfa I," Ui6JJ, '7! .... 
and 
r p, 
16James MontgomeJty, "A Question of Bth1ciu »"41'1era1 
Judge Presides over a c:a•e related to his own fortune.,• (Judge Prank Gray Jr. in the Whale.Inc. bankruptcy proeeed-
Lnga before tt&a u.s. District Court, Nashville, Tenn.) Wall. 
Street Journal, 176rl, OCt.ober 20, 1970. 
17Gairol Gigl.ict.t, ::,award, ~e P~i!X:, Marlo A~nis~rat1on 
10 
by criJainal statutes one branch of government cannot bring 
sanctions ageainst persona involved in conflict situations in 
another branch. 18 In practice, this means that 1.u1cept for 
criminal prosecutions the sanctions applicable to executive 
personnel are goinq to be quite different from those appli-
cable to legislative personnel. 
An integral part of the entiro problem of qovernmental 
behavior is the environment of double standards of morality 
in which government officials and employees serve. The 
public outrage toward certain activities of qovernment em-
ployees is obviously not directed at identical behavior on 
th$ pa.rt of off ioials and employees of various business cor-
porations in the country. Gift•9ivin~, the use· of influence, 
and lavish entertaining are all part of contemporary business 
techniques. It: ts obvious that. what is tolerat.$d in private 
business is not. tolerated in government by tho public. 'mere 
are those who deduce that th• exist.once of such a double 
standard precludes any real solution to the conflicts problem.19 
They suggest. that the prevalent standards of business will. 
undet'fdne those tbat are sought for government. This double 
standard may plaae public employees at disadvantageous posi-
tions in society 1 but. thcu:e is apparently no alternative if 
respect for governmental impartiality is to be retained. 
·of Justice in the u.s. 1 Evils, Causes a~d Remedies (Dodd, Meade 
a11'l coroi>any I .... Neil. York, I§g:n I 122. ' 
lBDouglas, Ethics in Government, 51. 
l9aalpb Eisenber9, •conflict of Interest Situations and 
Remedies,• liutg~rs Law __ Review, ll; (1959), 667. 
ll 
c. 'rhesis 
it ia in the context. of such.diverse and cOS!lpeting 
factors that consideration of "what. bas been done about con• 
flict of interest• is undertaken. The complexit.y of t.be 
proble.m praoludos t.b.a enactment of sweeping legislation aa an 
affeeti.ve ~••dy because of u.ru:lt.lrtainty about. the 11\lpaot on 
•o• of the related faotors discussed above. 'l"hus, a sort. of 
aittlat.lonal approach to the entire problem has evolved. Much 
progress bas been made in attempts to define a potential# if 
not nal, conflict of persol'lal and public i.nterests. Not all 
aucb defi.ni.tiona are sa.tisfactoey, but it has baen discovered. 
that it is only in the consideration of concrete rd.t.wation• 
tlu1t the problem acqu.f.ras real! ty. 20 
One rea~nt focus in the State of V1rqin1a on this prob-
lem area concerned the question of wh•tber or not state 
~udgea could hold directorship l'Osi tions in local banking in-
atitutlonts. J1 'A n-.ost valuable study of a similar problem was 
IU&de in 1151 by a euhcoNtnittee of the United States S.nate, 
Comit.tee on Labor and J?ublJ.o Welfeu:e. 22 'rb.e Study by this 
20tbid., 668. 
2l!J.c!_l~o?,!;i ~imes·n,~seatch., Jan. 19, 1972. 
225\lh(.:o~ttee of Senate committee en Labor and Public 
W•lfare, &2nd Cong., 1st Se&ut., !8£:?rt., on ~~.~.~!~ St~~~rds 
in aowrnment (1951) • 
.....,.P'Ji ·r ato lll',._ 
12 
aubccmmit.tee, chaired by Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, 
is noteworthy because of its tborou9hnoss and tor the recom-
mendations which it submitted. Although none of tho recom-
ttiendationa was enacted, they remain important to legislators 
u the basis for continuing national and state proposals that 
are offered to meet the problem. Since the conclusion of the 
work of the Ocuglas sUbcommittee, nutt\y more investigation• 
have been undt.u:taken by congressional committees in attempts 
either to oopa witb ·the. general problem <>f conflict of in• 
terest au it. affects the federal go'V'ernment. or to explore the 
details of singcle incidents aa they have com t:.o lig'ht. 23 
The Douglils study resulted in the introduction of le9isla.tive 
proposals-none of which was enaoted••tlnbodying- its recom-
mendat.1ons and of other proposals which offered a variety of 
response• to the situations which were eXposed. Investiga-
tions conducted oinee that tif'JO have alse> brought forth nu• 
merous fed•ral bills tackling the conflict problem. 24 
Deap:lta the concentration of public at.tent.ion on the 
problem as it. affects the fet'leral government,25 conflicts of 
int.eroat have also been of concern in recent. years to some 
?3 ;!:,'Appleby, !;!oralitx .. M~. ~in1st.ra1=-io~ 1~. D!,~crat12. · 
Qovornnient, 24. 
24~~~tres•f,e>nal QU!,ltte.F.~l ~~na! (Waehin9ton1 n.c., 
1971), 68. 
25wat.aman, £0?,~11C.:~.o.f Int:sres!_, 7t. 
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state government• that have undertaken studies in this area. 
&aw York, ·~exaa. Mew Mexico, New Jersey an4 Minnesota con-. 
4uctad inquiries ini:o tho problera an4 its ramif.t.catioua and. 
at~tee:i·to develop aolut.ione appropriate to their own situ• 
ations.26 · X~ is only 1n New York and Texas, howewr, that 
aucb stzw.U.u aul.m1nate4 in loqislait:lon. 27 In <:eorqla, on 
the other h.an41 bt:oad 109.ielation dealing wlt:h oonfllots of 
int.res~ and 1nolud1ng: forceful penalties for violation• wo.• 
eaact.1194 v1fth0ut:. the Wn&tit of• pr:Lor •#u4y. 28 · 
D. Approach 
. . 
BVide,n•.~oduot.ed fX'om etucliees .and proposals indicates 
~a't two fQftera1 avenuea of approach are available in bJ:ing-
1n9 fol'th conf11ot; .poli~. '?ha tlrst, and oldes1:.1 ia the 
4et1rd.t1on ot a COfl.fl1ct situation in a crlbd.nal at.at.ut.e 
. .. ,·,·" . 
witb pr<:>vleioa tor approp:tiate uanct!cma of tmprJ.aomuent or 
fine, oJt ltoth •. llbere la no desire to embrace wit:h1n a con• 
cep~,ot «iainality activ!t:.ies wtiicll may appear evil on the 
aui:t&ao but. involve no nal ra1soon4uct:. The result. 1a that. 
l' :; 
ed.at1n\J ci"imirull statutcu• dealing- wit.h conflict. td. tuations 
etthoi- a:r:e •PP1lcable to clearly ntpugnaat behavior or ue 
26a1a•n1'4trq1 •eonfl.lQt of J:nt:.ereat.,• 610. 
27 J • a. Klonoald., ed • . 1 The Politi.ca, of L~!,1 ..1U!,~ico 
(IJOSilOIU t.J.tt.1• lrcnm od co. , 1176) , 24I. . 
281bi4 •. , 241 •. 
'- .. 
14 
p•rased so genera~ly as to exclude a host ot activities that 
fom the real eor$ ot the problem. 29 Thus, moat statutes 
have been found inadequata as qu1des to evaluating current 
situations and have led to another approach to conflict cir• 
~e promulgation of codes of ethics u gu1dee to 
'JOV$'rnNntal behavior has occurred at both tllf:a federal and 
the fifty state level to meet this lnadequaoy. 30 A code of 
ethics 1• perhaps best. defined as a statonient of behavior 
for government officials t1nd employees. 31 ~he code may be 
embs:aced in a statute or •rel1' in departmental re9ulations 
or in a leg!alattva reaolution.. It 1erves the purpose of 
clearly a ta.ting to public of ficiala and to the publ.to what 
is acceptable behavior. A cooe may oar:ry with it sanctions, 
•1tb.ough the sanctions are seldom criminal. Dismissal from 
office is a common t!Sanction (uinly for ANL, ANE, ASL and 
ASB job categories) associated w!th codtut of ethic&. Im• 
plicit in the plt'omulgation of a aode of o·t.hicm, however, is 
the notion tha.t each situation in the future will be evalu .... 
at.ed on iL't pa:ttioular nterit41. 4rhis process, to be workable, 
requires some sol!e of enforoanaent system tbat. permit1l inves• 
ti9ation in'° the details of each situation that arises. 
•• . J I M• l 'oQ"f 1 ~ ·--
2!t!.f!R2;'t on . ~~~pal, ~~~~~1.~t o~ .. Inter~!!., .... ~.2:t.al~ti!Jn, 
pta. I•Il. 
30.nouglas, !,th1~¥ .. in . Govern~~!.· 7 • (Tbeau.a codes include 
9u1&111nee for cUt'4cutlve, !egls1atlve~ judicial and admini• 
st~a.t.ivo personnel.) 
3laeor~ A. Graham, Mpz;~J..~tz_~n.,Atllerican Politics 
~e nature of conflict. of interest dif!ficultic.s can 
only be appreciated in the s1tuat1ona themselves whiol\ are 
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of ConQ'brn to the public todar. Most. of the situations ara. 
c()l'QlOn to all lewls of government although their 1mpl1o&t.ions 
may~ quite different. on each levei. 32 1::)¢iattn9 le9ialat1on 
and lo91fllativa propoaala 4ew:mstrate a great cleal of aitni• 
larity in the areas of coneem. But they al•o rev~al cl1f• 
forenoos in the puticular situations that receive great 
st.reaa and in construing activities as oril'd.nal tb.a·t are felt 
"° be 1mp):oper. Otten the ditfetenooa in ~:unpha•ia derive 
f:rom particular air~tancea that have p~oved a problem of 
a. particular l~vel of vovomment. or atim~lnted 9eneral con""" 
cern .aa a result of scandal. J:n any case, t.rea:tment. of con-
flicta of interest. by the federal qowrnmnt and CQrtain 
GtateAJ. in statutes tu.l.d proposals J:eveals ~0v~ra1 broad aroas 
(New YorJa Rand.om Houso, l1.Hi2), 32. 
32Eisenberw, •conflict of Interest,• 669. 
CW\P'rlU~ II 
sunVEY OP UOISLATIOl'l 
A. Span and Scopo 
The principal, and perbaps basic, situation of conflict 
of f.:nt.ei:eat . ts the acceptance of eoiapensat.ion trom private 
source• for direct government-related services. Thia prac-
tice, bribGry, i• reflected in tho notion tho.t •a un cannot 
tud:W two masters at. the fllatae. time.• ~bus a public official 
.le not to ace.pt. additional e:ompensat.ion for the performance 
ot hia pUb11c duties froxa ·An interested party, or generally 
to • ae11 • hie infl.uenc:e to pEtrsons who hope t.o profit in so• 
Ma.aura through it.. Nor is he eXpected t.o profit hiNelf 
from his official acts or from his official position. Much 
qonf11ct. of interest legtelatto:n or proposed le9ial.ation cen ... 
ters about this problem with the situations that. must be 
dealt with 9onerally varyin'J in the directness of the sit~a­
tion's e"istoru::o. au~" as will be denoJ'ustratod below, it. is 
quite difflcn1.lt! to le9.tslate in such a way as to •et all of 
the varyinf fo!:tU and implications whiol1 develop in tbe area. 
We oan refer to the activities encOt'lpassed u the 
p:robleta of the usta of influence and 1>ositJ.on in qene~al. 
itost of the situations in this area of influence arid f>OB!tion 
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are difficult to define explicitly. 4rho key asswption be• 
bind thotll is that pllblic officials by the power or p.r~stige 
of their off too or tJ:1e friendships t:ha.t they cul t.i vato are 
able to exert oons.td~rable direct influence. on yovernment.al 
&iac.tsiOD.$. Thia tnfluenae canbe ma.ni:fostad in many wayu 
.ra.nq.1n9 from acceptance of another salary to the use of per~ 
•onal eontaotu to aftoct: a favorable decision by another pub• 
lie official in re~\U'n for c~ruut.t1on cl!' compensation in 
kind •. :tt also includes the !nfluenoe•effect th•t ensta when 
public officials aot. dit:octly as repreuent:.at!vea of a party 
in a case or hearing bofor0 qovernmantal agencieu., 1 
Two p11e:ral appJtoacbl!e to the cf4bove type of conflict. 
uitua.tdon are appar~nt. One daala in gen.e~al tams with the 
use ot tn.t'luence and the other 1eeka to treat the !nf1uence 
that po~nt1ally exlsts when direct representation occurs. 
The two cl.asses of $1tuat.ions are considered to90ther because 
t.he lat.tar kinda of situations tlr~ perhaps both the tWOat di• 
rect and in.direct e~mnples of the use ct influenc~r that, is, 
d1J:>eot !n thtii san•e of olear partJ.oipat.ion in a ceuHt and i.n-
~u ... i ""'"'""' n:r:ec1•• •anner bv which influence is e:icert.e.d. a """"'rec1'1t .n ~.u ..... ;:.~ .#; 
1. Federal teg!slation 
A prohibition ot fairly direct aituatlonll! of t.~1s kin4 
ha& lon9 b~en a p6rt of! a f'&il•ral lnw. Section 281 of !'itle 
ltii of the OnJ.t.ed States Coda originated in 11641 .and a1nce 
tbtdt t.1~ it has bMn &tm')nd+)·d to od.tber. include o~rt.ain addi• 
tion•l off1~ra or to e1'olnpt. retired li'111itaq, otfieera from 
CtJrt.a1n provisJ.ons. ni!s !lltatut.e prohibits COn\1t'tltSSmon, d$• 
partment. hoads, or other Un1te<lStat(tG officers and employees 
frolt1 •a1rectly or 1n4irec-tly• r:eo4iiiv1ny OJ:." aqrt1t-einu to r•-
ceive •My ocmpf;l.na~:tion. for any s~rvicos rend~rod or to be 
~ender•d., ~1ther by h1Melf or another• in relation. w any 
proceet11n~h • • ., befor-e any. departrJent., , or .agency. • • 11 • 3 
'itli~ tiuanot.ioru.1 pRvS.ded for vJ.clatiotui am a fine of not J1Wrt.t 
t.biui fl0,000 or J.nprimonm.er•t for up to two yeitu:n, o.r both, 
aa •ell as incapacity t.o hal<i federal offices in the futU1t$o 
Court cases ariaLnfi undiar s$otion 2S1 ha.vu givon broad scope 
to these proh1bi~tona. The pUl!'poee has b~en v.f.eved as bann• 
inci •b;ribery J.n .its open or subtle fona• 4 znld ouch practic~e 
•• ue J.noonsitJtent with an off!aial.*a loyalty to th$ •b¢tet. 
inte-re•t of the 9ovemr&1ant to t1hicb the et1A1~1cwee owea his 
f.lr$t and nigh.eat onliqat!on. • 5 tn addition, the wronq done 
4Mu• ... ~~~X •. "'•. 2~!-l.!!1-~!~~~!.' 3211u.s. '', i9 (1945. 
'ui11ted State• Ve loo~~, l48Fed.ll2 (e.,c.Olre.1t06) • 
•.•• 5'JW'""'ullifd;•Ml4••~•- ••>••""• o•tJ Llflldl ..... 
the publl.o by high executive or le411t$lativo officillltt who 
W'OUU try to unduly empl&J their tz•ower and prettJti~c to $~"" 
C\U'$ favor.ablec ;overn•nt.al at'tt:.ion has been noted. 6 
Tlta atat.uu i.t:t a.pplie~l" only to $eirvices of *Z)"f1cu-
ti ve (Mf2l) or tndepe.Munt a9e.ne:!cs tiJnd not to those <>f tbe 
court (A'NJ) o:t Con~tJsa (fJU.), a feature wld.oh eo~ persons 
ViGW as a ehortaom!ng. 7 Hu.ch rJritioisn baa boen <ltroetea 
at inadt.r:tquac1ea .tn section 281, tump~oi~lly in tho numerous 
a~cfaptlons to 1ts provi11ions Gnt,'1 in a lack ot cl~r.tt.y as to 
just what s'lttrvioeta are inalut..~ed. 8 
Federal inter&st. bi fU'itl'>lif!cat!on ot thJ& statutes 
tlea:U.n9' with .tnfluette$ wield1nq baa not r-e~ul ted in si9nJ. ... 
ficant; additional l.e<Ji,,lation despit$ alJtOf!Jt tnnm".fU."abl.*'' 
~J:opol'.lal.u. 'f1'lc Douglas staff report. ettJracad a. good tn.m.ber 
of th.es• an4 urged that section 2Sl be a•ru.ted to prohibit 
p4~nt of ~fuuatioo for intluenc~ 1.n addltion to the 
reoeJ.J~t o! •neh ool!1Pensation. 9 1'b3 report further rimcont• 
mnd• tbat section 281 be Ude applicable to Congr(!as and thie 
1940) 
&~ReF.\..~ P!l~e.f.!! .. ~~pt~!~!:. ... o~. _;t~!!~..!!~. ~Jtf.'l~~C?~, 
pt. 1. 
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oour:te. ln addition,. cl.arifiaaeion was proposed so that. 
nWU<i!U.t'OUAJ e.b:CUf4.Btance11 wh~re oon~·penaation is due p~rsons tor 
~o~v.toes performed prior to 9ovemit.0nt employment ud wb0re 
hdattal cmployeeG &id other f$doral ea1!1plora.ca in proe.c1Bding~ 
bofOh pvcu:noontal t.\4J9fU.':ie.9 (J .• e., f Ci Vil S!!ltl:Vi.Ce) CAUl be 
remov"4 from eov@.ra.g~. 10 Anotb'(llt" proposal was for a olari:f!.t• 
o~ddon of the prtutent e:xaupt!on8 to m~ction 201 a11 it af:f.ectlli 
r:etit-od office.rs of tho a~d torc4'1u1. 11 Other legi•lative 
p.topoeals aff~u:e(1 indttipei1til~ntly o.f the 1953 11tudy have 
gQtouiuN~ll:t 11ou:ght to aoeo~~ll.ish the s~ ends. Sither they 
wre propo~ttd mDX'() 11a.rrowl.y 1.n i.ndi.victu.al. bllltt or would be 
at<:®~~lished ~a p~rt of far broader bills that endeavor to 
enlarge the covcrtt9"e of t..'lG pr41sont statutes by def'.lninq. 
other aonfliot situatton$ .. 11 ~e 1at':k ot le13isl.at.1ve act.ion 
is t.•sti~ny to the d.iffie.ulty of d.:1fining euoh situations 
#atia.factorily. 
Mother federal 9tat.utl.i't in this area that causflJS 
fewot: dtffieultioe and oritiois11 prohibit• A gov~nmont 
off1eit\l or ~n~ployeo from reo~i ving any aalaqr in oonn~atlmt 
111.tb ht.a public dutltJa from any soue-e other than the f(llderal 
gcfta:in•nt ot st.a~ or local 9overnmont.s. ~•e prDllib!ticn 
·~pen $'!lob p•~nts is equally applieablA to tho governr.t-emt. 
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Gt:1ployees reoei,ring such salary and to per.sons or corporations 
:inakin~ the contributions. Violations bring penalties of finaa 
of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment of not rnore than six 
months, or both. 13 This section is so clearly phrased that 
few problems develop in relation to it. 14 It is to state 
level quastions of potential oonfliot of interest that atten .... 
·tiott is now direotad. 
2. State Legislation 
Act.ion by at.ate governments in this araa of prohibiting 
influence-wielding for cornpenaation or prohibiting the prose-
cution of claims aqainst: 'the st11te is comparatively rare. 15 
Xn the latter category, this is largely attribut.&ble to that 
feature of st.ate '4J'OVornment wherein many positions are ob-
viously not., nor intended to be, full-time positions. 16 
Fu:rt.b.e.rmore, the salariEHS paid such officials also indicate 
that something less than full•tima service is axpeetea. 17 Add 
to this tho generally beavy preponderance of lawyers holding 
------------·---
l3!,e2or~ •. ?n ~~~ca~_!!t.andarda in Government, 51. 
l 4:misenbcu:g, •conflict of Interest," 672. 
151bid., 673. 
-
l6Klonos1d., ed., ~ha 1)0!1!!_cs of .. Local_ J~~~!ce, 59. 
see also, Wat.am.an, £<'.tnfl~pt_o! ~terest! .F'?~:ft'ic~. ~na_tE.!, 
!.~nex. G~me, llB. 
l 7Burea.u of Census 1 ~aal and. StaJ::o .. Gove~_!l~e~t . rin~!l~s. · 
in .. selected Areas and LarJe ~ou~~es,_. !Tui-19,o twaufiln. gtona 
iureau · 'ol ciiiiii's, I9'I) , • The satary Breakdown for posi-
tions witb which this paper is concerned indicates tho salary 
is not sufficient a1J a $Ole yearly income. 
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bigll state political cff1oG, and the diffi'"'~lty of prohibit.• 
in9 import.an~ phases of a privat9 lm1 praotice ~aintainau by 
pu.blio officials 04m be appreoiat.ea. 18 Thia 51tuat1on, too, 
nas it.s t~i)a.ct. upon how one ~1.9nt interpr(\tt a pxohtbition 
upon influence-w1$ldiny Wh1)n, for exarSlple, a state lGg:islator 
in retained aa at.torn.,y in a. hoarinq before a public agency • 
.u. General Legialat.ivo Approaches 
l. tnfluenco•ped.dling 
Geor9ia, the only st6lte whiuh. bM adopted very •tr.in.• 
'1l'lllt :prohibiticnr1 on th.e question of se@king influence, did 
not cov.at: th~ variou3 other kinds of conflict questions. ln.-
st.ead, C®orgia dealt with many variations of influ.onc:e-s-el\lk• 
ing and w.?"eldi.ng in a relati voly apeoific stnt.uto wit!1 heavy 
o.riminr ... l aaxiet1ons av4ilabl11i. Releva11t port.iona o-f tho 
$tl'ict, ll!ingtby •t.atu.ta {:toimonatrate the Georgi.a approneh. FC:l" 
exm:nple, th@ lalil provideui tbats 
Wh(X)'ler, i)ein9 an of fioer,. • • '1.al~s, or accepts, 
or: reaa1ws, any r:t0ney, or any obecm, order, con-
tract, ••• for the l~H))1'ns&fr'tnt of money, or for the del• 
ivory or oonveya,ncl'it of ruiything of value, vi.th the 
in.tent cf proourin9 er att..a~~ting to procure the 
paeiuige or d~feat. the pas.oag-e of any l<tgiala.tion 
by th"l Gen4i!ral Asaernhly, ... • shall b~1 guilty of a 
felony, • • • 
tfnoever, being an of fioer 1 c~loyee, • • • accept.a 
r~on;ey, or a.nyth!r19 of v.:1lu~, .... eh.all be guilty of 
a :telon-/, • • • 
19Alex Weingrod, "Patrons, Patronage. and Political 
z;1Artie,')~l, u ~puf~ji.v¢! .. !.~U.\~if1~. ~.11 ... ~~ci!~l' ... !l!.t.~1. ?,;st9,~X, (July, 
1968), 4&&. 
Whoever prord:see, of f0rE*, or qi vea any mcrie.y or 
anyt.hinq of value, • • • shall be quilty of a 
felony, ••• 
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Whoever« being am officer or employee. of, ., •• 
or parson acting f()r tbs atato, .. • • •~ka, acoepta, 
or x:eoeivcs any money, •• • shall ~ guilty of a 
fctlonj~, AAd upon convietion shall he puniGbed by 
imprisonment in the penitentiary for not lcs1,; than 
one yoa.r nor w:>re than 20 yoars.19-
':t'h@ sections of the tleor9ia stat.utii quoted above etrike 
at. inf luencG•peddl.in~ by (.Utplioi tly ptiol'd.bi tinq tt4!Vltu:al man! .... 
faetations of it. Thun eeeld..n.~ to influence the l$9isla.ture 
far CO!A.i.?fll'il'Ul~tion is bai1n0d and tho 1iu:-ohihi ti on ia so ph~ased. 
as to e~rac~ eollcieat!on, aooi:lptanc~, and receipt of com-
pos1t!oi\, which in turn i!l e~pan<fod to inolude- almoat llU:) WlnY 
posfl1ble f<>rros of di:t:~)ct and indiract compemuation as are 
oonoa!vable. Most. .1r.s1,ortant, thn sto.tute seeks to strike at 
both ends of tl:.e ".influencfl process" by bannlngi both tht.• 
pe:r:aon ot'fer!n9 i.nd.uce~nt$ of var:touu i~lnda and the Qffic1al 
utic woUlt1 accept such indUCi!ll?aents. 30 Tb1$J1Jt1 $1!lotions are 
applicable to all off!i;:!al~ of the utate vith tb~ exception 
of members c.>t the a~org1a G~nert!ll Asaerrbly an<! officeu;s ot 
th'-l judiciary.. aut both of t.ht~se exceptions to th0 S«i'iOtion 
q~oted @o\ra arG covered bll' iv.1ditional f:Jf.tationtt 'tibich prohibit 
both the affflU:ing and aoceptlU'lce of inducenw:tltiil by theaa 
-----
•HJJainee c. scot.t, •corruption, ttachine Polit.:cs and 
Soot.al Change,• AtMtr~.~~~!.0~1.~.~S!'Ll~l!.£! .. n~'?'iet!, ,,3, 
(lt49), 192. 
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offioials. This is clearly provided for in individual sec-
tions, each of which deals either with the offering of such 
inducements or the acceptance of them by, first, the members 
of the General Assem.~ly and then judicial officers. 21 
The harshness of the Geor9ia Statute on inf luence-ped• 
dling is fairly clear. The sanctions are formidable, perhaps 
too much so. The coverage embraces all branches of government 
and both sides of the influence process, and the intention 
is apparently to include all forms of compensation by apeaify-
ing checks, orders, guarantees, security, etc. It may be 
ar9ued that Georgia's action is commendable, but there is 
much difficulty in the enforcement of the statutes and in 
merely determining the existence of the various forms of com• 
pensation. For example, the problem of determining if ain-
tent to influence• remains. 22 Naturally, too, there must be 
willi.ngness on the pa.rt of responsible officials to investigate 
and prosecute violations if the statute is to be meaningful. 
The primary characteristic of Georgia's conflict of 
interest legislation adopted in 1959 is the wide scope of the 
act. It embraces, in addition to the provisions quoted above, 
activities which are not usually considered to be part of the 
aonf lict area•-the gray zone--but rather belong in the black 
22Eisenberq, dconflict of Interest," 675. 
~oma of clearly and c>bviously i.mpropcr activ1t.ie$S. ~or9.ta 
troau itn.;bg:zlemnt., thaft, extortion, misau!l~ of public 
fund$, ld.ckbacka, purjury, 1$nd wome aspect$ of bribery in. 
the •~ broad statute in vh.tch less clear nituationm are 
at.al 
2. AppeH'&.ncea Bitafo~e State Jl.90ncit19 
flew York' a approa<;h to t.h~ 4i.J~neral problem o:f influenc• 
Md pt<ll!taai.nq elai~ &9ainat tho state d1fftu;$ ma:dt~dly frcna 
G~or,g!a's. Uew York's. statut&o, enacted in 1954, atnploy a 
a<1parate t.ec~ud.qu4l for atHilinq with eael1 of t.:!H:t!h1~ p:robl,~m 
a%ea~h l'itst, t.hil conce~-;>t of prass.tn9 claim$ a~airurt the 
st.ate ta bro11d~Mri to includ~ •appearances befor'd state a9en-
cd.t.u11. • 24 Tli1a cx1lar9es th.n Bc<>pt.? of th$ prohibition so that 
:u.e~nsinq board$, t~9ulatoey ~fJttmaietiJ, franchiae-~td;erh1i.ng 
of uonfltoe allt'HJ~tio11s in case-a btit,ftn:.'fi.\ such agena!~s of both 
tlua f•4l~ral governmiu~. and eitat.aa, a ttider oov~t'Q9'~:' is cer-
2ti tatnly ap~Ji'Opriat.u., tjzhus tlGW Yot"k f..>l"Ohibi ts ~x~<;uti ,..re 
offic~Jt• o.nd e~•loy~etJ 4s w~ll as l(:!9lll4lators and l@qirslat.tw 
employees from reolf,living or enterirt'l into an a~:p:@<e~t)nt •e:K• 
i~::&s$ or i~'liea• for cont.tngent foes for s*'u:vtce!IJ to be 
23Ga. La~.,• l9S1l. e.24, Sec:. ;a1. 
24N. y. !?t.tbl.£a Offiae:t"a Lav. Sec:., 73, Par., 4. 
2. 5GeQ.t9'ii. A. Grahaft, 1;Jif!-.!.~i .i~ .Alr'6~~.~!w.-P9.f.!~~~?., (New York 1 iumdom. Bouao, . " . , 9 • 
26tbld. , ''· 
-
:u; 
t"$n<l$red rttlaUve to •any Cl.l:ao, proceedin9, ct):i1lication0, or 
ct.ber matt~r b$fore any st~t~ agency.•27 It is ~apecially 
i~Qrtant. to not.o that it ia only wbt.'ln contin9E-mt foes are 
involved th~.\t a state official is barJ:ed froitrt etJ)ixuu:inq before 
''11t'tuAlly all ~tat:e ageno.114$. Otherwise it is not dtl\)~~d im.-
propex- for s~oh offioe:r:s to roake ltppearanoes. 28 Tho limit.a• 
tioll. of the prob.lbit.1on to *'contJ.ngent f~e" ca£Jes ia a roalis-
tic approaob. tthich •cknowledgae the existElnce of d.uAl roles 
fot many •tate officials, part1cul~rly leqialatora.29 It 
seeks to daal with a troubleso~ ar<@a wi tbout ~tu1.tng un-
n~aeau1u1rily non-qovfll~ntal aeti vi ties of state of fioiala. 
VJ.elation of t.I1is l'>t'OVision is a mi•dairieanor. 3° 
At* for the 9'~nera1 problem of sc.'el~ing or <ixerting ln• 
tluanoe, UGW York bas ahO$tm to legislate prohi.bitions without 
l'ilil@'ll ill.,, ••.•• ~.,-•• 
27New y,or" Public Officarli Lav* Sec., 13, Pau:., 2. 
28Ibid. 
-29nayless ,Manning, "'l'hs Purity J?otln.toh..1 An ~suitay on 
Cf>nflict. of Inttare1t, J\rt'.e~i.can Gowmment, and Moral ssoala-
Uon,• f:$der..!!~ii.r J~na.~, 24cl, (S~r, 1964), 79. In . 
:t'cference iii a puEicutu Comonwoaltb of Vir9inia situation, 
the :reru1Gli: ai\jfht..look at the efferts of Delegate WilliAn 
:Rwlinga tn ~lie Virg-lnta Qeneral Assembly. tmle9ate.J'tAwling-11 
riu been atte~ting to ban ~ppe11ranc:es of Virqini& Gen,u:al 
Aa!Bembly iniembitu:s as c;ouru11~lm in eases before the Sta~ Corpora-
tion. co~.tHfion. ~ff~~~~. ~.!!:!~·Pi!!!~!:'-<?.!l1 March 11, 1973. 
JON~V York Public Offioei::s Llf.w, Sec., 75, Par., 6. 
27 
Ql:'iminal sections. irney are e'!lbraoed 1n a Gtat.utory eode 
of etmtoe conta1n1nf :aev.ll'al relevant vrov1u1one on the a.W• 
jOcCt. ln itfl atatoMnt.a of Standards Of beh&ViOlt for ijJOVOX'rl.• 
•nt employe9s. Activities prohibited include. acaeptan~ of 
•othe~ e.mployeant which will !mpail: hi• in(lepende:nca of. 
:Jud.pent. in the exercise of bia official dtUtJ.es,• 31 ud uatnq 
oi: attmaptia9 to uae. one• s •off io!al posi t..l.o.n to aeoure 
priv11•9cs or: e~•inpt:ioua tor hiaself oi: othete.•32 These pro-
visions •~• applicable to offloera and employoes ot state 
•pnoi••i logi•l~~:r:a., ~ logislative euployeff. Iu a&ti• 
tJ.ou ,. tbe code atr.lkes a.t the J.n.flilGno• pft>bl.•m :by · 4eol:ar.S.nq 
tba~ a public official ahoul4 not. conduct hisnself ao u to 
•91ve ~••sonGble ba.f.a for the 1Japress1oa that any person can 
~rcporly tnflut0noo him. • • .•33 Furt:.he~re, a stat.a 
.offJ.oial. •should an®cvor to pursu• a courao of conduct Vbieb 
w.f.11 not. ~•1•• a\laplcion among. tl1• publ..tu ~a-t be is likely 
to be llng&tJOd in acts that are in vJ.olAUon of hi• trust..•34 
Yne aUt\tte deacr1b1ng t.11cu10 stan4artta pJ:ovitlea no aqction• 
f(:)lf tbeic v1olatJ.on. one ata.tut.e ot the conflicts package of 
1•'if• ill 1154 .. npow~u~·a4 the attorney 9"tteral to eat.tblish an 
rutviaot:y co.tt.too °" e•"!S.oa.1 •Htan4arda to oon.ttuot 1nveau1• · 
9aUou and IU\ke J:faCC-.n4fltions conctarn.1.n.f al.l•ga4 vtolationa. 35 
•t .l h•••Rill'•" > fl•.i•f ...... 
llwew York P'Ubl1c Offtc:asrs t,aw, sec., ?4, Par., 3. 
32tbtd,, 
, -
33tb1d • 
.. ' I' 1 
34tbid. 
35uew York Bucutd.ve Lav. Seo., 74. 
Imt;)lioi. t in the New York code is the J..d(l& that the findini:;s 
and. reco~ndat.iona of that COfl1..mitt.~e and the Attorney · 
Oe1un:al he fo"ardecl to the @tate agency pos$e~.using disetpli• 
n~/ aut.hori ty ov~r the indivt4ual or individuals concerned in 
nported violatlona.36 1th.us appropriate disciplinaxy act.ion 
emanates fro~ th~ employing agency. .such tU.~c1p11ne WQ-Uld 
inelud- auspen$il1on OZ" r•~..oval. 
By couchintt ite aon~d.d.uration ot the infloonc~ problem 
Li1 general. te~, New York aaknowleetuaa the difficulty of 
cl(l)arly <i'd!:lning what is t't°'~Jt or improper in tha individual. 
s.itiiationu •• tb.;eiy oat.nir. The 1nvasti~at.ion i'.ff to be aceom-
p11llht\ld by an OUt.$1de obj"ctive boey. 37 It may be argnBd" how--
eve~. that nuch a gener.al stat.e~nt ofi improper behavior ie 
~an1ngla~ui in practic~·-tbat 1.t is so 9.,nor:al .i'lS to forbid 
not."ling specific. Tl:tls wty be so,. but !ti. does sicn:vc to 
cl.eat:ly lnd.!aat~ to tht) e~loytife or off'!<:d.tt.1 and to th~ public 
that: suob a general at.an.dud of conduot ltli &xpeated. and t..~at. 
Vh$n viol~t.:tons ooour~ thetf w11l be inventJ.gat•c.1 and some dis-
ci.pl.inary st~p• ta):•• It offer$ the public a!lsur1Ance of an 
tnv<ulti.gation into allegatioom of i~ropri~ty and tb.o of fi• 
cial o:t employee the a~auranoe that each caet! will b1!-l dealt 
with. indiv1d.ually. 'Zbcu:e are no r~strietd.ona which confine 
tlle ®termination of irnp.rop~r aotivites to specified 
characteri,stics nor ia it po~sible to em.brace peculiarity of 
appearance within the notion of improprJ.ety,. 38 
Texas end:-eavored to treat thEi general problem of 1n-
f.luencu!l in its conflicts legislation but omitted any dirEtct 
refereneG to th$ prosecution ·of clair.is against thie stau. or 
appe4l.ranooa befora stat$ agencies. The Texas legisl~tion 
promulgates a code of ethics without criminal aanct.!onlll. 39 
Provisions relevant to influence af feet of'f ice rs, er~"'>loyeea 
of state ageneias, legislators, and legislative employees. 
Such a person is prohibi·ted from accepting 11iftn, favors, or 
services •that ~i~ht reasonably tend to influence him in the 
d1sobarge of his official duties,•40 usin9 Hln official posi• 
tion to secure special privileges or ex~mptions •except as 
may be otherwise provided by law,• accepting ether employment 
that "might impair his indll.'Jpendenoe of judqt!lent in the per• 
formance of his public duties,• or aoceptin9 additional com-
pensation for his 11Jervices for the state. 41 Taxna proviaea 
t.hat. violations of any of the prescribed standards of conduct 
36t:iaenber~h •conflict of Interest,• 679. 
l9~exas Lawe 1957, Par., 6. 
4oibid., Par., 2. 
41£isenber9, •conflict of Interest,• 6B2. 
constitute grounds for e:qJuls!on, removal from office, or 
discharge. 42 However, there is no enforcement mechanism 
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created for the Texas code. The principal advantage to be 
cited for the code is that it does describe a statement of 
standards. Determination of infractions, however, will still 
require much thought and probably involve great controversy. 
What is employment that can impair independenoe of judgment? 
What does •reasonably tend to influence• mean? 'rhe specific 
problem is that these determinations will be made ad hoo as 
situations arise by any or all of a number of power centers. 
Such is the case generally today and the Texas code of ethics 
really will not afford much assurance to the pub>ic that a 
determination will be made or to an employee that a really 
innocent circumstance will be fully and impartially explored. 
3. New Jersey 
New Jersey, in its comprehensive study of conflicts of 
interest, sought to dea.l with both the problem of appearances 
before state agencies and the use of influence generally. 
Because of activities that stimulated the study, New Jersey 
was particularly concerned with condemnation proceedings. 
one of the principal recommendations of the New Jersey Legis-
lative Commission on Conflicts of Interest was a statutory 
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proh!bi tion upon rece1 v!ng, directly or indirectly• oompen-
aati(>n fo:: ae2':V1ce1t rencte.t'ed in connection vi~' eithf.UZ' con• 
d~mna1d.on neqotiations or in prooHdinqs before a eonde-m-
naUozi co.iaidon. 43 ~ia ban wau -to a.pply to atatq offiC$>:a, 
enploy•••, appo.l.nt:ees, and ~r• of the l•~rf.slature. tn 
atiaition, 1t waa pa.-opoeed that thi• attme groupof person• 
co\114 not, for compensation, •petrsonally appea.r- aa an eleport; 
w1t.n••• be~fore• any of the eight:e•n erut•rated stat.«t 
. egenoiea. 44 'lhtasJo ~encies i1u::l.U({,,4 'tl1e Dapal!l'tmont. of Public 
tltilttles, Divta1on of AlC«ib<>l1c nevera.90 Cont#ol, D1vta1on 
of J;totoJt Vehiclea, O!.vislon of ':ax Appe•ls, State Pat"olo 
aoai-4, and tbe Wag-o an4 Hour nuroau. 45 It was further rocom-
u.ndtad that thoae 9Q11t.y of violatin9 either ot these pro-
posal• would .,be punished by fines up t:o $3,'000 or.a mmttmum 
of two para .ln p•laon. 46 $-he obvious a!uaracte~1atlo of 
~·•• ~o~ndati<uts ia t.hair b~ad sc;ope. Prohib1•1nq not 
me.roly contingent fee appt.u11zucea. but all c~onsat:od appeu• 
ancea before tiJ• enumerated st.ah agenoiea antl in cont.tomnatton 
prooeetiaqs tllef would have. had a treMndoutt impact. upon a 
• 1awyfUt•heavy• 1e.tt1•lature an4 upon lawyor hold.tru1 loss than 
fllll•ttmo position• tlu:ou911out. st.ate 9over.nNAh. 47 lfbey do, 
, 43Re2!Rt nw Janey Lo91•1aUve COM!tution on COnfl1ot. 
of 1ntaxoiit"tst'ate Printing Offiaea Newark. :w.J., 1957). · 
44. Xbid •. , a1. 
4.Slbid., 21. 
461bid., 34.-
47.nalph Urf.i.ih&tlti, •ttefleotions on Bureaucratic Cotrup-
Uon,• ~~~0J¥,~~1~~·?.!~~~1h 4014(1962), 11. 
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howovor 1 illustrat(fl t.oo vigorous an apJ)roach ·to the contl1ote 
prOble•. Al~hough aomtlU!trKlable aa an atto1$1pt to s~ut all 
doors to tl1e ~t critical eonfllot situations, such pro-
po•als nu.at be V14'lwed u botli 1.-practioable M4 inapproprl.at:e. 41 
~copit..ion of tho .faou ot st.ate governmant. ln:tnga to tlla 
f.roat the con.tral th•lSle that many state officials do not hc14 
fttll•ti.JllO positiona .nor 1n .oat. caaea ie there iK\ed tor tbea 
to do ao.49 . certainly, •tats ana local legislat;orat ue ex-
~cted t.o be only part-ttu polloy-kWlkers, e.nd the uso of 
1n.m.-1:0w. put-ti~ ~aa1c~ere and board -l'l'lbero by utntes 
-4 1oca1iti•u• 1• we.11 Jtnwn. so ~o limt t tJ~ private actt vi• 
tie I$ of thetto of fic.ials would cripple a 9ood part of stilt• 
... · ..... 51 f;CWt'nM&•""• 
Xa cOittr•t to the h•r•b lfJ>CCif Ao pi:oid.tli tiona dis• 
cu.seed flbove, t:be New Jersey groUp recom$?\ded a more tem-
petr&te ~ppJ"eaoh to th• lnfluence-wl•ldtng pr:obleio. Many of 
.t·ts pr0posala Ln thS.s area w~o based upon th• Mew Yol:'k 
jg" ···-~····-..... tjq"" 
48 ih.i.d., tt. 
49s.., Ch•t.ax xx, footnote 17. 
solfh• read.Qr sthoul4 tak.e note qf the work load •it,,u•• · 
tioa. Xn Vir9inl• logialat.ots at. both tbe at.ate awl local 
lewl a" &:>r the t30St; pa~e put•t;.lme Polley.make~•· tn 
sev~u:al otllu states and. at the fttdel:al level ctonflict of in• 
t~H.'fHtt legislat:i~n applle• to ~· full•t.1• le9iala1:or. Xn 
tnis paper we have choaen to Wile exm:splea of oontl.lott. legi•• 
lat-S.on without re-g•i:d to t:he put:-Ume 01: tull•tl• •t:at:u. of 
the l.•gialatolr.· · 
Sloa the other hand th• hiring of more f \lll•t.iae protes• 
raionala wol'.lld c.aus·o enon:ous salary expett:a.i tur••• Walt8lan1 
con,fl~cst.f>! I,!lt;eJ;"eat1 , folitlo~.ftl!~.~e .. ~~%.~, 182 .• 
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statutes .. 52 Under ~~e threii'lt of crird.nal ~anctions, ng~ncy 
}>O.t:,sonnul ar~ {:!rohibitead frotu rec"ttiving COllitp.ensntion, d.1-
;;ect.ly or indirectly, for .wonie~a renaered or to b1ii\ r~nd~1red 
53 in Griy ~"4tt~u: vhiot'l is b~fore t.b.at auenc.ty. • A ;'.!ilta:tut.ory eode 
of ethics l·Ut.a i~ropoaed as the principal t~eana to oopc t.Ai th 
'this probl~a, suppl.e..."Wtnt.Qd by Q.ep~rt~mtal cod.C$ to de.t11.l ~1th 
tb.e. paculiariti\;$ of tb~ problQt;: in .each stat.'il1 and local agency. 
Thin co4~ prohibits et.at.e ana local aqenoy eJ:l'lployeau from uae 
of official posit.ion to s~~cu.re Advantages, and fro11l acc&pt.1nu 
ot.hor ei.~lo~~unt, or gifts ·•t~hat. rd.$iht mau~on®ly tend t.o in• 
flUQ!10~.. th.a ~intJ of detJis!oru!f. ~o other proviaions of 
tbe ~cu J~rC'lf cooe . z.n:e of 1.nter~uit in this regard., 'l'h~y uet 
No State off.teer, e~loyflto or 1$p~1ointee tshou1d 
41)ngaSJ~ in a cou:rse of cont1.ltct which. t'Ai'tfh.t c:.rcatt~ 
~ t:"QUonabl~ 1t11'.)%'0Sf»ion nmu9 t.h~ :pt(hlie tha.t he 
ia. likely to be engayed in act!l t.hlit ar0 in Vi<>-
lation of l'Lis tr,.111t. 
RU1es of conduet adQtlted pursu3nt to tb~ff~ prin-
eipltui should ra®';;ln1~·$, ... • th3t. citim:Qtui ~ho serve 
in govern~mt ca.nnot ~d should. not bG &h"Pect0d to 
ho wit.bout pet'£Jonal inter01it •• • 1 that cit.i~eng who 
aN vowrnment. off .tcial~ ant:1 4U':l;~loyee$ havtf a right 
t.o private interest. of p~rsonal,, financial and e.oo-
nomic nature; that standards of conduct sho~ld 
separate those confllot.$ of int.J?.rc3t. which ~.~tt una.void• 
nbla in a free society from these conflict.a cif int~r~ot. 
vhich arfi substtantial and matnrial, o.1!" which brinq tbe 
govnrnF.ent lnto disrepute. 54 
;:a I ti. tff It t:' lli~t: 'J 1¢ A 1 '1 l 
pJ:inciple$ which eboµld guide any endoavor to effeot zu11me• 
Qi.es. !J.'hat. th(ily provide no definitive assistaiioe to the 
. ju.d~nt proouuui in individual sit.untie.ms ia 4PtlU9nt. BU.~ 
thfly can provi4~ ade<1u~tc standards by which au.1 inwsti9atitlg 
body may be guided in itt.t exploration ot a aase heforfi it. 
An anforoemn.t ~ch£mism. almoet identical t.o that of i'Jev Yo.l'lt 
Mi.nnosot1t undertook a st.udy of aonfl1ct of intet"sat. 
t11ro\i9l1 a covt.lr:ior'u Co~itt.lllte on Etbica in Goviarrunmnt. Thia 
Committee's reool1lt"l(m<lationa55 on appllltiUran®s bafor~ s·tato and 
1ooal. a.genoies and 011 iuflu.en~ ~ene.tAlly w~re ~d• in the 
form of fl broa\d code q.f etb.tcs ~hioh wu l.at~r onacbl;d by the 
l&)11$la.~u.r~. 56 1'ha aommitte~, hQwQver, did not rcco~nd &ny 
.apacific amct.ions to l.\Ocoapany itli code. It did ur9e ·tha~ 
th$ ®de be Q!1acted "'-•1th 3ppropriate sanoUons• but 1t. did 
not. try to offer an:t guidani:e as to what: uanotio.na Wt)t:e appro-
51 priato for ctu:ta.ts1 activities. ~ha ooi~t.t@e•s re11ort de• 
cl.~da "'A va.riet.y of m~tboas and approacb~s \rill probably 
b\l neadad.. Bnforoar:.ent by crlrAinal proo«u1s and punisb~nt 
should be the v;iu~y last re$o.l't. but it should be available. • 58 
u ! ' - .... _' ; ••' .' .......... 
sslit$;r;t, Minnesota Governor's Committee on Ethics in 
GovernmenEt."' r>aulr Stat~ Print Shop, 1!:)59). 
56Minn. :t,.aws (1961), Section 16, Par. 14. 
57 Report., Minn., 20. 
58 Ibid., ll. 
-
The lrti.nn~sot.a coo~ would bar th~ us~ of posit.ion to 
achieve •:ap~oial privileges" ~nd 'the nl!ceit)t of g:ifu or 
\at:lltui.tit9s from smu:<..""es other than th~ nt.a't~ in ctmnEJat.1'»1 
with in.iblio duties. It alao would iu:ohibit a public offiotal 
from having any intar~et or ubli9at:.!ons, or 6*ngagi~g in busi• 
~ss or transactionu or tlrOfil'a~s1onal a:cti vi t.y "w~ich .ta. in 
conflict ld.t.b t.be intob,~li!' di~oharga of llis <tut.i~s ,in the p~ 
lie int:.er~at,.. • 59 The, ¢ode include9 tha ~nnd~to that• 
!:lie head of $aoh st~ta agency should p\Abli~h 
fer th~ guidance of itu officers and e~loye$e 
a cod~ of .. puhli.c eervic~ ttthica ap,r,l:topr.:1.at.e to 
t:.ha mp~cifie n~eds ot each such a9enQ.l"•60 
With ·tJmise provi®iona, the eom>:iU:.tea trir.Es to d~$l 'tt!t.b tbe 
qenaral. t"roblar~ of 1ntluenoa and con,luot. 
The pt<obli3m of a~:iit:>ecu:anceti'l b~to::e 3tate a9'er~cios is 
ap~roac..."led t-11 b"'l mot>e precision. Two out.right. prohihiti.ons 
W4.l.t'$ urged., '?he first wottl¢l bllr both legislator~ ~nd ayency 
employ~elti f ror~ acting as agent o~ attorney in th{! pros.aaution 
<:>f claimi::t ot."l~r than the r~~rformance of bis o.ff ioia.1 dat.ie111;. 61 
The s~cond r,rohibi t1on !a ei~n.t l&:r to tha.t. encount.ar~d in liew 
Jor:.u:ry 1 but t.'11 <t..h M ir:-4Paot: nolely Ul?On liagislato:rs. Thi• 
propoaal ,,n'I t 
Ho le9'i.$lator should accupt any ernploymt·mt 
or rErta.in~t far at"veeranctus bf!llforo My statt> 
board o:t' agency. l:nquir.y tor ix1fo~ti.on on 
btlhalt of a conatitu~nt may wit?t propriety be 
St 
. Ibid. t 33. 
-
' 0ntnnesota La~1s, (1961), Pa.r., 111. 
61Ibld., Petr., 11 • 
...._..,._, 
aadu, but no fe~ 1 ~:!ft pr favor obould he ac- ... c~pted tb.oreforo, either directly or imU.rectl.y. 62 
The onlr OQmment. tluat can be aade about t.heae propoau1lt1 
is that tJie fU.t=st group ehoula encow\t.er little e:ritioisxn, but 
t'.he second ia perhaps more vulner&ble than the ainila3:' flew 
Ja1usoy v.ro11osition. ln aMi tion tho tact that appc.uutanoes 
befo~ at.a.te a~ru.~iea constitute! an alrJtOSt 1ns~pa~able phase 
of oth¢tr ata.tf.? o:ff1oiale fr()m the p:r:ohibltton fltt.td.kes ar~ oh-
aerwlt' as tt:uly dincrind .. natin~ again$'.\!! t~te l.e9!s.lator. The 
limi tat.ion ut:>on prosecution of cln1rnt1 agid.1u1t the auto would 
not. have tlHJ ir~paot that th& proh!hi tion a1l)'a1nst appearances 
be.fo:r:e state a~ncies conatitut.-e an altaest inf!eparllJ.ble pbo.se 
of the pr1vat$ law pract.ices of many leq:islators,. t.be o~s­
sion of at.hEn: •tate of fio:L.-1~ fr.om the prohibition strikes ~n 
observer as truly diacr:bd.nat..i.n9' a9a:i.nnt. the leqialator • ":he 
iitnit.at.ion upO!l pro90cut:Lon of clai• nqa.1nst the at.ate would 
not have the iinpact that t.be prohibit.ton eg~iut iap~arl!inOfaa 
before !lltat:e fttJt1.nu~ie$'.l would Ju1,ve. Gl 'fhe la.tt~r would be ptu.• ... 
t:;aps too disruptive of private activitea (whioh arG> proha..,..,ly 
most often l.e~itimate) -nd trd.mtcal to aduquate te91!1lat.1vo 
r~~t.ment. 64 
62 ·.. ' Ibid., var., 20. 
6 3ul\'.~P(~:r..s,, Minn. , l 3 a. 
' 4&iGcnberg, "Co.nfliet. of Int:.er~st," GS!J. 
~- f.ia:-st. area of aonflict, ai tuat.ions f!bat will b111t 
4iscuasod ia th.at which devBlops ~1th :reyaxd to l~gialat.ors 
and legislati v14 etQ.ploy(les partiaul.tlrly • 1 Althouqt·• soma: of 
t..:10 cituations r~nt.ioned above llffact. leqi.alntora ~nd lo.9i-
~lati ve ~loycGs, tbfu:e arm l<UUlil otbara in wbich they flJ.a:y 
};~ involvsd undQt' a far diffe&r~ne £J(!lt. of circw-;..-wt.anoe:u than 
those in which ~uteC"Jt.iV@ ager.icy officials fiu.d thcn~~alves. 
Gon~ra11y, d~a.U.n9 wit:i a.11 aspoet# of the ltlgial•tiv.s: titide 
of oanflict.s at int.\Ur~st n<iYire11 sepnrata wcnni<'iUC!l a.lf.I ~· 
J:esult of the principle of separation of powf.uta. Crirtdnal 
statutes., if empl.oy~1d, can ewn:ace leg-isl.a.to.rs aa W-tJll .ns 
ot.h@r 9oviim~~l:t fl«iu:aonnel. nut no 0th.er 8.im.otion short of 
criminal proaoout.to.ri oan be invoked against legislators by 
4'.ly zi.'lt.Um$ or Agency other thiUl t.be le9ird.at.ive body. 1 Leti•• 
1atur~a tJiO~utasa clear au.tl'.10.ri ty ·to ~"lk~ rulea 90verning t.he1r: 
- U ••• ....., .. , 'ti:i .-.,_1,.,.., 1 •n 1·"fi<j11RW.,·•..,.. 
l~hc term •1t!!~ialati w e~l.Oj*'ees• r.ef'ers t:.o tboGC) pe~­
oons directly ~oeounti1ble to th0 l~qinlat:or who at ti~as act. 
in t.b.~ naw~ or in ploc~ of the leqisle.tor, e.q., St.&ff 
A111listants11 
2aieen~r~h •confliat of Interest,• 698. 
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men'.bership. No one can threaten a legislator with dismissal 
from office except the legislature itself. 3 Criminal statutes 
are difficult to :.~mploy when dealinq with. legislators because 
it is extremely hard to differentiate :between activities that 
are an appropriate phase of a legislator's job and those which 
90 beyond acceptable conduct and cause personal gain. Often 
the distinction is merely one of emphasis. This problem is 
particularly acute in the area of the use of influence. 4 For 
example, a.a essential phase of a legislator's role is to repre• 
sent his constituency and to oblige his constituents. He must 
often contact an executive agency on behalf of a decision, 
or cut through red tape in order to expedite the handling of 
a particular matter. The demand for such action by a leg-is-
lator is great. Yet, it can ba appreciated that any of these 
aots if pushed with sufficient emphasis or threats could 
coiurtitute the use of influence to obtain favorable or unequal 
treatment by a government. agancy. 5 To further complicate the 
matter, a request for information by a key legislator could, 
without intention on his part, be converted into favorable 
treatment by a sensitive government agenc,:y. 6 
3Ibid., 699. An exception of course is the recall pro-
cedure which is possible in some states. Wein9rod, "Patrons, 
Patrona9e,• 400. 
4weingrod, '*Patrons, Patronage," 492. 
5araibantic, *'Reflections on Bureaucratic Corruption," 
108. 
6MaKitrick, "The Study of Corruption," 239+ 
Other related factors include the need for private 
income and assets for legislators and ~'le implications of 
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their private activities to their public duties, particularly 
in the case of lawyer$. The legal profession is constantly 
involved with aome phase of government and the saturation of 
the lawyer-legislator in elected state bodies is replete with 
the potential use of influence. 7 The critical problem develops 
in effecting a reconciliation of private legal practices and 
the public interest. 
A. Federal Legislators 
An essential difference must be stressed between the 
Congressman and the state le9islator" Congressmen a.re per-
haps capable of treatm.ent as full-time public officials; 8 
state legislators, except in a few cases, are not. Therefore, 
it is only recently that interest in curbing the private 
activities of state legislators has had serious reception. 9 
The degree of litrdtations placed on state legislators, it 
would appear, would have to be less than those available for 
Congressmen. nut in terms of conflict legislation there are 
fewer restrictions on the bf:o..havior and activities of Congress• 
men t..~an on state legislators in states that have acted on 
10 the problem. 
109. 
7weingrod,•Patrons, Patronage,• 496. 
8congressional Quarterly Almanac, 72. 
9Braibantic, ffRefleotions on Bureaucratic Corruption,• 
lOSparke, •conflict of Whose Interest,• 689. 
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The action, taken or reCOmh"lended formally, to be 
examined in this area is that which seeks to ~et tho confl!ot 
probler.a in the legialat:ivo bra.nail apart from the general traat• 
r.ient. of conflicts of interest among agency personnel. .Most 
suoh action occurs in the promulgation of codes of ethios fo~ 
legislators and legislative e~~loyees. such codes seek to 
deal with t.he diffioult., undefinable aspects of conflict of 
interest. 11 
Congresamen ara subject. to re la ti vcly few liuiJ. tationa 
upon their personal activities and interests. They are pro-
hibited from practicing befor@. the Uni.tatl States Court. of 
Claim..'$ but otherwise rerea.in ra.th~r unrestricted in tt1ei:r 
pri vats aoti vi ti as. 12 After lonq p:res~nu:e the Con.qress did 
approve a concurrent resoluti<.m that set forth a •code of 
Ethics for Government Sarviee.•13 Intend~d to be ~pplicable 
to •any person in Govorm~tent Serv.ice,• thQ code taight be in-
terpreted ea iroll to con"'.tey the aanse of Congress relative 
to the behavior of its m-m roombership. The codg contains 
extremely )Je11eral stat.em~m.ts of standards of behavior• It 
calls for loyalty to eountr"] and "highest moral principles• 
abov~ all other loyalties, and dadi.oat:!.011 to the cons ti tut.ion 
an.d the lt£ws of the Unit.ad States.14 It deolaret!J that public 
officials and emt:>loyeetJ should •giva a full dray• s labor for 
121s u.s.c., sea., 282, (1952). 
l3a • .R. con. nes. 17.S, BSth Cong • .2nd Seea. (1958). 
1441 u.s.c., S~a., 126 (1959). 
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a fu.ll day's pay" and sasi' t.o accomplish their tasks cd:fi ... 
ciently an~l acouom.tcal.l)'• our oon<:el.."fi is for proviid.ons tw.re 
directly related to zituations of conflict of int1l;l;reat. bow• 
&var~ In this .ragard tl1e coda d~clares th.at .a peruon tn 
~OViH:"nmi.lnt n-tarvice should not ". • • d1$Ct"itninate. unfai.rly by 
the di~1)~uisii1q of special :favou-;; or privil~ig(i.\a to anyone, 
uh.~t.hez- for rt:~muneration or not; and never acaopt, tot: hi:taselt 
OJ: his :family, favors oit b.:mefit.$ und'14r circumatano,~e ~i1ich 
rnigbt oo con~t.rued by roa.$<.mable pf$raon$ as influ~noin9 the 
~u:formana(l of lti~ government.al duti.os.•15 ln additiozi prt• 
va tii pro~d.ae.s at'~ no·t. to h~ hiadia that are hi.ndin.g upon th-a 
du.tie~ of of11ce.. Aliso h~ should 11e1ig11191J in no bu.id .• "'less with 
th~ ~ov£u:nnient, either '1.irectl:t or indirGctly, which is in• 
ccn1si~t.@n.t with the or,msu:ien:it.ious pelt'.forxr.nno-0 of his qov<arn• 
%1~ntn1. duti~11J. 016 Confioentinl Jsiforrl..!ltion is not to he ua~d 
•titl a i:ooani;a for t.'Wl"d.l'.HJ i;i:-ivata profit. ... • 11 A public servant. 
shi:::n1ldt t;1,f!J well, ·~~t1oae corruption Wbtlumvli!r tliscov~rtiid.. • 18 
~he concurnmt r~$olution et:abruai:1g tbia code of 
lS 2 Ibid., Par., • 
-
lSibid., :Par., 4. 
-
view of Congreos on the su.bjoct. It might be eruployed by 
Congress itself as a 9uide to the~ behavior of its members or 
emi1loyees. should Congress choose to exercise it. It. can per-
haps act a.0 the standard by which Congress oould cen.sure its 
~embers or disciplin$ its employees. nut there is no con1.pul• 
sion for thelil to so employ it.. 19 While it could employ the 
code on an ad hoc basis Congress rdg.h.t have embraced 1 ts rules 
in liJome form and provided a rooaniJ of enforcement. 20 Of courae,-
this w~s not done, and t.be real impact of tho code is slight 
indeed. 21 Xt contains no provision for enforcez..ient and no 
direct statement of its applicability to Congress it.self or 
any impl.t.ca.tion·toward. the stiates. 22 Its were adopt.ion, how-
ever, could be of si9nificai1ce, since previous efforts to $e-
cura any other action by Congress on the subject failed. 23 
n. St.ate Legislators 
New York reco~'Uized tlia need for distinct tI.~eatment of 
·the le9islative side of oonflicta of intE:rast, especially in 
19 . . 1 Ibid., Par., o. 
20Potentially, of course, Congress does have such mea-
sures as Ethics Committees and Party Causes which have enforce-
ment f!lftans. 
2lPeroy, tt'I'ha Crisis of Public '!'rust,• J4. 
22aeeent non-statutory effort.a at reform have includ$d 
reports by various Nader Comnrl .. t.tees and by Common Ca.us~. 
23.fzimenberg, •conflict of Intereat," 672. 
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.ro-gtu:·d to '1!nforc11.unitlnt of it.a eod~ of i.!!t-hics.. 24 At t.he sar.1in 
ti??..m that ita oonfl!ats 1:1tatutas were adopted, ~ac.h housQ 
of tl'.ri! 14ew York l~gi'1ln:tur~1 cri)~ted a Cotnr.d tt.e~ oii Ethic~ and 
GuldMec. ~lfJ eo~mtt.~e.s ware 91.ven th~ reapons!b1.lity for 
r~m.tivf.n~ .r:u·i4"l i.n"ittH:itiqating cornplaint$ an<l charge$ aqnimst 
1u9tlitl.a:t.orf.t or lagi.3lat1ve ernplo;1ooa for violation~ of thct 
Nf.t\<t York co;fle. Find.tnsrs and r<:H::ol'!'~<),:ndation8 var~ to 1~ r~­
l'ort.ed to tbia ~pp2!'opr1ate la.1i1-enf'o:reeime11t ag-enoy. Tho co~ 
mit:tec~ '1'ter~ also authoz-ized to ren<for advice, upor1 roquest, 
cc.mo1.;u:nb'.\9 potttli.hla violat,ione of th~ cod.a and to ~ecot"ll.~en4 
t.inleudt\l!.Ut.t$ to t..~e <:ode or t.o e.>iia·tin~ law. 25 
\'l'l.E.11 ~ii~w York system. of handling the legislative prob• 
leta p:rov1dt1s a ~ans ·w<he.;;rat>y orit~ria for legislative bisa-
.h~vio~ ~re avaJ.lable and imforoen.wmt may bt' aeaomplished 
while pt'e:il~rvinq tho leyislature's prero~at.iven ovet" their 
ooflimrs tuld u~1~l(>fE!es •. Ultii1,1nt~ responsibilit.y still li$S 
with tlw l09!$lature it.self, however, for thfl succes!.l of 
th*l t1ystel'ti. nut for~lly presentad compla.ints will b~ ratbo:r: 
difficult for th:e comttitteas to ignore or ratti<>n~li&e away.:Ui 
')4 
.... Scott., •corrup:t.lon, 
C~:u.i:i.n.9@ , u 216 • 
~§':t.hesifj eommi.tble.li are astabli.$luii:d amlQa.lly by .reaolu• 
t.ton of 0ach h<>use of the !~tgislatue. For o:t&ttple, 1n 1967 
t..:'1@ poi:Unant.:. resolutions wet'e s.!t. 145 ~nd A.R. lS!G. 
This New York system has served as a model for proposals 
put forth in New Jersey on this aspect of the problem. 
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The New Jersey report urged the adoption of a supple-
ment to the rules of each legislative chambar. 27 This sup-
plement would embrace a code of ethics applicable to t.'1.e 
membership and employees of each house. Among the proposed 
provisions of the oode are prohibitions upon personal interest 
or activities in conflict with the "proper discharge" of 
c.luties in the "public interest," use of official position to 
secure "unwarranted" privileges, lobbying activities, receipt 
of gifts or favors that "might reasonably tend to influence" 
a legislator's behavior, and the disclosure or use of confi-
dential information., For enforcement of the code of New 
Jersey Commission recor~i.m.ended the creation of standing com-
28 
mittees in each house. The function of such committees 
would be approximately the same as those of the legislative 
committees in Hew York. The Commission's recoror..iendation 
were not adopted by both houses of the New Jersey legislature 
at the time of their submission. In 1958 a code d ethics was 
28Ibid., 33. 
-
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ad&.td to tll¢i li!i'.#W Jaarsey GenEJral A•aembly Code of Etbica ~ 
a lo~islatiVll 00:<1."Utt.e0 waii cstablish0d as 1u1 enfol:'ollimwnt 
vehicl~. 2' 
Minnelrlot.a, Texas, and. Georgia did not prov1c1e or l'eaor.i- . 
mol'1.d sepiu:at.tJ cod.es of et!:d.es or enforcetu"ent systems toi: 
legis.l.ators. tu. l9GO, a aod0 of leqi.alativo etllics was draft• 
«4 by a New ~~xi.co L~gislatiw cow:icil cot~itt.~e. 36 ~bis eode 
had t.'1e appearance of being o. leglalator's 11 pl0d.gi.t• of be• 
ha.v.t.or. lt was stated in very 94tne:tal terrm that. would he 
difficult. to apply to concrcte oitua.tions. A significant 
ptovu.t.on was fo:: t.iwi f!linq of a statement of sou.tatts of com-
poiltHtt.ion by legialatorn wbere 1 t. Di>1~c1.u:ed that such so\U!'cas 
l!le~e d!a:eotly concarned in mat.tors bf.iforu the lQg:i.slat.ure. 
N<ew Me>Uco clao called for a lflgialAtor to pled9e to vote to 
cenin.u:o or e~l .fl member who violated the studa:r~ .• 31 
A tinal. 00~11t. ~ut lt,gislative conflict. of intet'eRt 
iaut. be made, for it. cc:meorns a preei.se arEia 1n whicb un• 
animous 1191:e~ment ex.tats. All. reports and auoi)ted coaen .in• 
cludu the i)rtu1cription that leuial.atora ar'3 not to vote Ul)On 
29u • .;r. Laws, 19~9, c. 94, P~u:·., r;. At the 1958 soas1on 
of the N.J. oeneral Assembly, a resolution e1nbodyin9 sue~ a 
supple•nt to the rulea wa• adopted and a 1Ggialative comittee 11ru eutabliabe4. Fro. 1959-1969, tnr~o oases were beard ancl 
dJ.o~1esed b~oaus1tt of insuffioient eviafl?u:e. ~Tobn A. Gardner, 
'i:h• Politic& of cyrf~li9fl.. .... 9;L~!!".!f .. ~~!=,~ ·~h~!i~~ ~-'t:l!_ fi~ew' 'forki•' tUUSQ &g'a · OW\ at on, J..';;j , . ., 
30m,w Ji~xi.ao ~CJi•lat.l ve Comi t.tee" !!!":..~~~. '1~!'!. 9,~ •. ~!!.• !~.,~.,-• .. ,1;1~1cp,,, s.a. 326, lSGl* (Adopbiad) • 
3l1~ew. Ha~oc .Laws, ·1961, c. 4~, Pa~., s. 
st.a~nt of such in:tera:st i$l required to b-e n'i.Ude tietrt of 
tha letfialati vo juurrial. 32 ~hlo.~ prohi.b! tion is not uneowri01'l 
in th$ rt.llalG of leginlati VG ho'1i~m m4d tlial:~ is li ttl!!;l eiaa ... 
33 ~dre1S1n>~nt. to be fott."td with U~tl :prineii)le. 
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CH.APTER IV 
PERSONAL INTEREST 
A second broad area of conflict of interest situations 
stems from the principle that public of fioials should not 
have a personal interest in the business transactions in whic:::h 
they are engaged for governmant, nor should they exploit their 
influence or acquaintaiices with persons who conduct such 
transactions so that businesses in which they have a per-
scmal interest are benefited. Persons who have interests in 
business activities subject to state regulation may sindlarly 
be in a position to profit from f<.lVorable treatment made pos• 
sible either by their direct participation in the regulatory 
process or by their access to or influence with the actual 
regulators. This last situation is more subtle and difficult 
to tretlt than the more overt situations of negotiating with 
oneself. Mal;ing contract awards on behalf of government to 
one•s own firm is cor.uuonly considered reproachable, as is 
perhaps regulating one•s own business. 1 
1paul a. Appleby, Morality and Administration in 
Democratic Government (New York: Macmillan Company, 1963), 
192. . -
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The difficulty in this area, however, lies in deter-
mining the extent of personal interest in such business enter-
prises that potentially would be harmful to the public interest. 2 
In contemporary society, personal interest in business enter-
prises, more often than not, consists of a partnership arrange-
ment, ownership by a close relative, or ownership of stock in 
corporations. Stock ownership in particular has proven to be 
a confusing problem. one of the best examples of the dilemma 
that can arise was that presented by former Defense Secretary 
Charles E. Wilson and his huge stock holdinqs in General 
Motors Corporation. 3 Although he disposed of the stock in this 
situation, the matter was far from beinq settled by followinq 
that precedent. 'l'he fear in the Wilson situation was that 
his position in the administrative hierarchy of a department 
with which his former company had so many business relations 
might affect the decisions of contract negotiators. 4 Yet 
not all government officials own stock in the quantities that 
Secretary Wilson had nor do they have his background of cor-
. porate executive experience. But stock ownership is common 
in the United St.ates today and it may be presumed that there 
are certain stocks which almost every person with an adequately 
2 Ibid., 183, 
-3tbid. 1 195. 
4Ibid., 196. 
-
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diversified portfolio possesses. 5 Therefore, the essential 
question becomes that of ascertaining how much stock owner-
ship in any enterprise may jeopardize the public interest. 
Newly sworn in Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell chose to 
divest himself of all his stock interests so as not to jeopar-
dize the public interest. 6 Another perplexing facet is how 
close a relative must the owner be for there to be grounds 
for suspecting that oonttaot awards may be made on other than 
the merits of a case. or, how are partnerships to be severed 
when one party temporarily enters government employment? And 
finally, and certainly not very much less important, what of 
relations that devt~lop in the area one step removed from 
direct connection with government business or regulation? If 
personal interest. is held by a public official in a firm which 
sells to another firm that is regulated by government or seeks 
government contracts, ·there may well be grounds for suspect-
inq a conflict of interests, especially if the official has 
th• .responsibility lbr the t'&9'\lla.tion of the second firm or the 
award of contracts to it. 
5Donald J. Kingsley, Representative Democracy; 
(Cambridqes Harvard University Press, 1955), 211. 
6New York Times, Nov. 15 (4) 1971. 
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A. overt Situations 
Consideration of situations of this kind have occupied 
government in the United States and brought forth various 
remedies in law and in proposed laws. Criminal statutes 
ex.tat to prohibit.the mostovert.,m.anifestations and codes of 
ethics have been employed or.su9gested to cover the other 
subtle forms. 7 · Attempts have been made to define. personal 
interest that should be appropriately regulated •. They have 
included the broad concept of •an interest,• •controlling 
interest,• and the definition of a certain percentage of 
stock ownership in any one coi:poration. 8 A publicity device 
has also been used. whereby the pertinent. financial interests 
of certain offict.als would be .declared and in most caaes 
made available to the public. 9 But no one rexnedy has 
been found satisfactory, although proposals on the subject 
•re almost legion. · The states, pa.t'tioularly, have enacted 
or proposed.solutiona. that qenerally vary with the extent of 
the incidence of the problem in the state.and the reception 
of responsible.officials to the praQticability of the various 
?Eisenberg, •conflict of Interest,• 669. 
8Braibanti, •aefleetions on Bureaucratic Corruption,• 
106~ 
9Robert s •.. Get.a 1 ConSf!essional ~thios 1 .. The Conflict · 
of, Interest ?tu1u@ (New York• Van Nostrand, 1966), .. 166. 
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approaches to coping with all of these dilemmas. The only 
common method that is apparent in the code of ethics is to 
promulgate acceptable behavior in this area rather than to 
employ a series of criminal statutes to prohibit many speci-
fically defined situations.,10 
There have been many proposals to establish a system 
of publicizing the personal financial interests of federal 
and state government officials through a reporting procedure 
with the information so fathered available for public inspeo-
tion.11 No proposal of this sort has yet met with any suc-
cess •12 · Publicity as a solution recognizes the difficulty 
of defining proper and inproper situations and seeks merely 
to collect relevant information and allow the publio to be 
lOAll fifty states have some kind of legal code of 
ethics1 for a complete breakdown see, J. o. Millett, 
Government andl?ublio Administration:. The Quest for 
Responslb'i'.e Perlormanoe (New York: colum&Ia university 
Press, l941J, 492-:.1 For a more cecent and briefer analysis 
see, Bayless Manninq, "The Purty Potlatch: An Essay on 
Conflict of Interest, American Government, and Moral 
Escalation,• Feder~l Bar Journal, 24:3, Summer, 1964. 
11:sraibanti, •neflections on Bureaucratic Corruption,• 
107. 
12aecently the organization, Common Cause has begun 
a campa:dgn monitoring project which may be very similar to a 
program needed in the financial interest area. For a complete 
description see, The Cotnlt\Qn.Cause Manual on Money and Politics 
(Washington o.c.: · common Cause, 197~). 
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the judge of what is proper in the particular instance. It 
also endeavors to place the public official in the position 
of deciding for himself what the effects of his known in• 
terests will be, and to make adjustments and bear responsi~ 
bility accordingly. 13 
B. Less 1 Apparent Situations 
The state of G$orgia'a approach to personal interest 
in business takes the form of criminal statutes that define 
unacceptable behavior for public officials. They describe 
both overt circumstances and less apparent but' related situ-
ations. Many of the provisions are unique in comparison to 
the usual solutions and descriptions encountered.elsewhere. 
All state officials and employees who receive some form of 
compensation from the state, including per diem fees, are 
prohibited from selling any goods or merchandise to the state 
or any 11tat.e agency on behalf of themselves or any business 
entity.14 It is not com.pletely clear whether this prohibi• 
tion is merely applicable to the direct act of sellinq to 
the state by such a person of the same business entity who 
sells to the st.ate. 'l'his would appear to be the case, .in 
which. event only the direct participation of state officials 
in such transactions is barred, and then only if the official 
13araibanti, •Reflections on Bureaucratic Corruption,• 
122. 
14aa. Lcws, 1959, c.24, Par,, l. 
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acts as salesman. 15 The provision apparently would not 
apply to officials transacting business for the state with 
representatives of a firm in which the official had a private 
interest. Georgia also prohibits the making of false state-
ments by either state officials or sellers to the st.ate rela-
tive to material, labor, or costs, and also bans false repre-
sentations conce:rninq material, labor, or costs with intent 
to defraud the state.16 In addition, Georgia declares that 
contracts or conspiracies in restraint of trade or of "free 
and open competition" in transactions with the state are 
illegat.17 · Violations of any of these sections are considered 
as felonies punishable, upon conviction {as other violations 
cited above), by imprisonment from one to twenty years. It 
should be pointed out that the somewhat peculiar orientation 
of Georgia's treatment of contracts is attributable to 
alleged scandals in that state in thi~ area which precipitated 
the interest in conflicts laws in the first place, 18 No 
legislation was enacted to meet other rGAmifications of the 
problem. 
15
.aisenberq, "Conflict of Interest," 696. 
16Ga. Laws, 1959, c.24, Par., s. 
17Ga., Laws, 1959, c.24, Par., 6 • 
• 
l8A. J. Heidenheimer, Political CorruEtion (New Yorkt 
Holt Rinehart Winston, 1970), !o2. 
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c. Selected State Examples 
l. New York 
New York's action in the area of private business 
interests and potential conflicts of interest that develop 
therefrom reveals a concern with broader and more subtle 
ramifications of the problem. Generally, New York deals with 
the problem in its code of ethics, but criminal sanctions 
are also employed to meet a varieti' of the circumstances in 
this area. New York. requires 001npeti ti ve bidding before 
contracts exceeding twenty-five dollars can be awarded. to 
firms in which state officials have ten percent or more in-
terest in stock. ~he requirement is set forth as followsa 
No officer or employee of a state agency, 
member of the legislature, • • • shall sell any 
goods or services having a value in excess of 
twenty-five dollars to any state agency unless 
pursuant to an award or contract set after 
public notice and competitive bidding.19 
Violations of thie provision are to be treated as mis-
(lemeanors. 26 There are two significant aspects of this New 
York law. The first is the prescription that ownership of 
ten percent or more of the stock in a corporation constitutes 
sufficient interest to create a potential conflict of interest 
situation requirinq statutory attention. There have been 
other proposals to define personal interest as reflected in 
19N. Y. Public Officers Law, See., 73, Par., 3. 
20Ibid., Par., 8. 
-
stock ownership for the iJUrpose of determining when a po-
tentiality of a conflict of interest exists. Some urge 
' 
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20 percent of stock ovmership as the critical point; others 
propose lesser percentage figures for this purpose. 21 New 
York's definition of 10 percent is one of the few percentage 
figures to a·chieve enactment. 22 The second aspect of the 
Empire State's efforts in this law is the requirement for 
competitive bidding which it establishes. By not providing 
an outright prohibition of business transactions with the 
state which infers that situations of this kin.• are funda-
mentally unsound. for the public interest, it reflects only 
the potentiality of such a clash of interests. 23 Instead of 
prohibition, public competitive bidding is to be the means 
whereby equal treatment of all desirous sellers may be 
accomplished. Placing the amount of affected contracts at 
twenty-five dollars i.s further assurance of such equal treat-
ment. 24 It should be noted that the requirement of bidding 
2lchicago, University Law School, •conference on Con• 
flict of Interest,• February 20, 1961, Chicago, iii, 100, 
Series 1'30. 15. 
22N. Y. Public Officers Law, Sec., 74, Par., 11. 
23Thomas R. Dye, •oifferentiation and Cooperation in a 
Metropolitan Area,• Midwest Journal of Political Science, 
(May, 1963) 1 127. 
24Ibid., 134. 
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rat.her th.an £)robibitio."l ia sn:efara.hle to ooat. situations 
in whia.,11 there may be oul.y one 1'nown available uupplier of 
e. cotun0dity or ::lervice. 25 To uan transact.ions with tiri:ruJ 
in which a ver~onal · .int1are~·t of a public official exint~ 
~d wh.!eh yet. a~~ often the sOlQ (iUpplie.ra i.n an area would 
be foolish. The l'iew Yori~ approach on tbia i)oint ia one that 
oould w-all t-~rovid.e a moael for other atat.os or goverxunental 
unit~ inti.ta.rented in A po4\laibltJ an.&w~r t.o this phase of tbe 
conflicts ptoblet'l. 26 
1fhe maw Yorl~ code of ethics contains u~vera.l parai;:rapl'u1 
deal1n9 '4it.io'l contract&l or ir1terests in busin~ss t.rc.nsactions. 
T'Mt-Q u~ g-in1fi:tnll1r p!~rased with much. room for interpretati.on 
of t.b.e $U1.n~ta.nce in vol vad in each s1 t.uat.ion. ~be:t eleaborate 
tho princ;iplo tbnt public otficials should not have a prJ. ... 
vcttJ interest that. might. conflic·t vith ttuair public dut.io• 
and t:ttsponsibilities. 7be vorclinq of these port.ions of the 
ood@ of ~tbi.c~ h~s 'been closely followed by other states t.i;y• 
ing to solve t.be probl~~. 27 It. is \Uleful to quote th~ here 
u t.hey ara :represtmtat.ive of mimil•r lewtslation ea pro-
pottals in ot.het' $tates .nient:ion(:Jd below. 
2'J~u c. Scott, •corruption, »aah.ine Politics and. 
Socto1 Chafe,• 70. 
26Bit1tH1ber9, •conflict. of IntQr<tst.,• 6Sfi. 
21soott, •cor~ption,• 72. 
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No office~, • • • wuuber of the le9iflllat,u.re • • • • 
•no\ll.d have ~1 intorast., ••• in any buuinetui or 
t.~ansa.ct..lon • • • of any nat.~re, wlliei.i\ is in sul>• 
st.mrtial conflict. vitb the prop-tu: discha:rqo of his 
dut.itUia • • • 
ua officer, ••• Ghou1d enq~ge in any tr~­
a.otion as repr~s4).n:te:t1ve • • • ot the st.11rte with 
· m1y husi.n~aa en U t.y in vhiol:1 h(~ haa • dia:cot 
or ind.b:ttct financial inueroat that might 
r~u.\~Ot,&bl.y, tona to conflict. with t.be p~opcr 
iU.•Ob.argo o:f his official duiZ1oc. 
An offi<:lil:r, ••• should obot.ain frotl main9 
perso.'1.il.l. inveo~t in ent.urprisf.\s wbicb. he 
h~• r~ason. to bolieve mny be di~ectly involve4 
in d!ici.sio.tui t.o be redo by bi~ or whicli will 
otberwiae c~aate sub•tant1a1 conf ltct 
bet.1'1tiu~n, .ilia duty in tho public inter@st and 
Ma: private intesre•t• 
tzo officer or eaployee ot. a otate auenoy 
@.lJll:-loyed en a fu1l .... t1~ bu.i~, • • • Qhould ttol.l. 
floods 011 serV1C$& to any c~any, fin, ••• 
which i.fJ .1.to**naed o:r: whose rates are f ixcd 
by t.he at.ate a~ncy in whtcb such of ficears 
m; etai~loyee sle.rves or is enployed. 2 G 
Al.tllough the•e proviaionn app0ar rathfi'r 9en$ral it is 
well to noeo t:bat c:om;tl.a.Uits of violations of tluam would b~ 
invcst.igated t;h.a:-ough the New York ef\for<Wmnt syoto• do.scribed 
eulier.29 Alleqat.ions ol violations vould ha~ the pertinent 
i·adts elicited upon inVe¢lt.i~ation and pitted a.gatn•t. tl:i(.l 
general standar<hs of tbe code.. In tbis way, tb• c.~atibf.:U.~y 
o.t tl1e circ'tmistance4 of tho al.1tlqod conflict s1t.uatLo~ and tbc 
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stat1dards of the code would be established. The person in-
volved would then be either disciplined or entirely cleared 
of the oharge. 30 
Another provision of the Maw York code of ethics pet-
ta!ns ·to the same problem of personal· interest 1-lthough some-
what merged with that of influence-wielding. It utilizes 
publicity of personal interest in businesses subject to state 
regulation. The code provides that state officials, legis-
lators, and legislative employees who have a direct or indi-
rect. financial interest of at least $10 1 000 in·•any activity 
which is subject to the jurisdiction of a rag'Ulatory agency"' 
should fila written statements of such interest with the 
Secretary of State. 31 Such statements would be open to 
publio inspection. Although the publicity approach is briefly 
discussed earlier in relation to th.e federal government, it 
is appropriate to explore some of the perplexing facets about 
it as this point since New York employs it. The efficacy of 
publicity as a remedy to conflict situations is thought to 
lie in the deterrent effect that filing statements of finan• 
cial interest in various activities and having them available 
to the public has upon the behavior of persons who might be 
tempted to seek favorable treatment. It is thought that 
30scott, .•~orruption,• 72. 
31N. y. Public Officers Law, .Sec., 74, Par., 4. 
affected pernorrn would hesitate to influon-oo act.ion if the 
public could so oasily be prov!~d with infonmuion as t;o 
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the e~d.f&tenc:c of financial interest:. 32 Perhaps in a sense 1.t 
amounts to cirownstantial evidence t.hat could in certain cir .. 
cumst~1etls pruve.exceed!ng-ly embarrassing- durin9 a political 
cm.f!'kpid.gn or bi the process of having a nomnation t.o an 
appointment confi~d. 
1.?h~ idea Of publicity, however, bas riil!CftiVad much 
c:r1ti.o1sm bacauae it ia felt that. it oonat.ituten an invasion 
of the privacy of public otficiale. Tlis arquaent holds that. 
public officials, like other individuals possess a right. to 
privacy oonaarnin9 th~!r p~u:sonal affairs and th.at to breach 
it in this matter may lead to furt!ver invasions in otlier 
areas .. 33 
fthis must be reeognimed a.e a very nerio'WJ crit.ici$m 
end. it. d~s po~~ a contJide:rablo di.lemma. now much privacy 
should t..~ curtailed in order to guard against the oeourrenae 
of a conflict of interest situation? It is an extremely clif-
ficult queltit..ion to answer. ot C()uree~ theria have been in• 
~lf!anaets in wbic;ll th@ private financial si tuation!I of public 
flgutea have bean bared voluntarily, although usw.lly in re• 
spons• · t.o political allflqatiorts. In this respeot, one need 
point. only 'to the disclosure of tho personal financial in-
tenats of presidential candidates in 1968 and 1972. .aut 
-· ,. 14'.1 t ~...... '"'" tli<t 
32RObort s. Lane, Political Ideology {Nev Yorkt Free 
Preaf.1 1 lflf2), .47. 
33Xh.\4.• , 52. 
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that affected political candidates already in the heat of 
electioneering and not career or high-level officials who 
might be less prone to rnaka such disclosure. Certainly the 
mass of citizens in the United States value the confidential 
nature of th.e;r federal income tax returns. It is difficult 
to conceive of much enthusiasm for having such data e>.."Posed. 
There is certainly a price to be paid for political activity 
insofar as privacy is concerned, but how great must this pttce 
be? Anc1 what of the non-political career public servant? 
2. Texas 
The Texas code of ethies contains several provisions 
dealing with transactions of the state. 34 tt approaches the 
problem by making its prohibitions applicable to firms in 
which state officials or legislators have a •controlling 
interest.• Tb.e code declares that an official or employee 
of a state agency is not to transact business in his official 
capacity with business entities in which he is an officer, 
agent, member, or in which be owns a controlling interest. 
Similarly·such an official and the firms in which he has an 
interest are not to sell qoods or services to firms or cor• 
t;JOrti.tions which are either licensed or regulated lly the state 
agency in which such official is employed. 35 :Publicity is 
34'I'exas Laws, 1957, c.100, Seo., 3, Par., 4,. 
35 Ibid., Par., s. 
a1oo employed in the· eaaos of stat" ti9$ncy parsom1•l or let• 
ifi,lato~st who ~re UUtmbcn, offioorn, agants or who haw a aon.• 
tro11.1n; interest in bu.irta$9 entd.t!ea 5*Ubject to the juru• 
diotton of a •tat~ rogulat.oey a~eney. %n this •1t.uat.ton, 
such a pt•u111on in to "ff.le a &NOm ata't<!:ment:. with the Secs-otar:y 
of State dlsolostnr •uo:b Lrttero•t. • 36 'rh•ro ts t:ha sec11d.ftgly 
•l•etto pt'Ovie.ton 1n. tfto 'toM·h code- wbl~l\ altU> declares tha~ 
on officer Ol' e~loyee of a state a-ncy 1# no1: to make 
p&l'Gonal lr..via•tments tn any enterprit• •which will or•ate, a 
•Ubst&t\Ual oontlicg bet.weou his privatua 1nt.er*eta and t.'e 
p'QblS.o 1ntue.ut,.•37 
3. N• aeraey 
ft• ._, Jea:uy .proPQaala contal!\ t.wo provi.alons te ••t. 
'*- 1d .. tuatio14a tm4•~ d1•cus£on bere., The fJ.•st wou.ld eliploy 
Ol'iJd.aal ••ct.ions to, pl'Ohib.f.t a et.a• of :f1o1a1 fros act.inf 
aa ap11t,; ot th• at.ate in tt:au1utct1ng- bua1neaa wi tb ld.••lf 
o= ·•vi1th a '101JPOt:aUon, ~any, aoaociat.t.on ot: ftra in t.be. 
pacnmitu:',Y pt:ofJ.ta of which ho bu u btereat,.• •••P~ thatl 
•owna&'.ailip oi- control of ten pe»itc.ntz or ltu•s of. ·ttut stock. of 
& ao.rpo#aUoo ahti.l not: he doel!l\ed an l.Aten•t. withlft this. 
eoot1.0th •38 ~1$ pi:opo•al l• ba9e4 upon tb• Nett Yo:»:l't. statutes 
•4 employs t.tui ·~ concept. tbat 10 percf!nt. O{ftnershlp of 
a•o>= i.·• aulfio1ent1y tn1bstan.tial to poae a potaoU.al ccm.fl.io~ 
tt If l . t'. Ui ............ 
lG.~~a ftew ~ 
. ·ii>U.Z.llll•"f _._. f .V• 
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of inte:rcuit. 3 ' ih~ t<~ow Je.rsay report also follow9 th~:t example 
ot Hew Yo:rlt in ims~ooinq cr1minn1 ttnnotions upon st.ate official• 
01; firm;a in ·which tl~ey held ~uoh intarost "lothich •ki1m1in9l~'· 
a.nt~r 4Mtl:aat.£J for OV$r twenty•fiV<a dollars \1itl1 tho ~tat~ 
Ul.1le:ss auel1 con.tract.a wet:e set. after public not.iotl A.'fl(.1 aot!l ... 
~:etJ.Uvo bidding. 46 ~he H~nf Jersey code of et.bias also con .. 
ta.ins tr.'l:t.e bron4 standard t.hat a st.~t.~ officer, e11~'>loyG«t;; or 
411.pI,)()i.ntiae s~iould no·t: engage in bus.lnl$'tS$ t:.riuuutotiona with any 
entorpri~e ln whiob h0 bas a direat or indirect financial 
iat~~~t that •rd.ght. rea~onably tM4 to confl1ut 'A'ith the 
p~o1~r 4iaol'11.\r~ of his oftlcial dutJ .. <u1., • 41 
4 • i'4Ult'.l~lU3otD. 
Hinneiuo'ta follows the etXIU'l!Ples s;uat. by Mtl~t Yo.t'k ant.\ 
t,raxu in Ltt1 c:od.t!i ol cathios wU:.b, howwur, Lt.a. ow particular 
~ttcations. An off.t~tal of a state a;en~J .t.s not. to trcns• 
act buuine11a 1n hia official capacity l:r1tb any entity \fith 
wtlich he bail a t)@raoi:u:il intttremt.. • 42 It is to b-e noted that 
tb1a law does not def.in~ what. co.tiatitutas an •int.$reat.• 
3
·
9see footnotQ nQfl.lbcr 22. 
40 tt. J. Law$ 1 1959, a.12, S~o., 36, Par., 2. 
41-t'i.. •A n .ii. 
· ..,.ul."'•, ,..ar., •• 
ti 
· Minl'l. L_s, .1960, c.4l.t Soc., 2, Par., ts. 
St•te officialfi ~u f1r~s~ w1 t'1 i:lh.ich th~y ~u:4) tJ.f f.iliatt)(,,~ o~ 
in w~d.~h th~y 'b.t4Vlll a CO.."'&tr.olling inte~~~ (tt.{Jain undl2'fi,n~d) 
aro not. t\t> $.Jtall 91t.>od~ or u~wioos to bu~1.n~1lis tnit.iti~lli t.hat 
~re r~tr.Jll.lt.\";d by tlla ~tllt~ a<J1S:1~ur1 in wbich ~u.c!:t official i• 
G-~lc.:t.,4.111 43 A broad pulll1c1t.l' 0y{ltfiM waa altto recor,;fi~1::n~litd 
by tbG Minnt;}sot~ t;roup. 44 '.ri:1iu \tould .hatre r~quirtii1d ltJq1$la• 
t=t1 ~4 l<ttgliilativ~ cm-pl.t.'>f~i~ui, a:9Qncy oftiC4llr.4\l ~d •atieh 
em'ploy•e" tbe~~of a~ th~ a9ia1ulj~ haad t:tny by t'"C911lat.tot"1 prov.tr.lo• 
wt1to -~~ affiliat~d w1tl'l 0r mm tm int~t'-.l!!Jt t.n buat~t'?tUJ en• 
t1t1.$$ .;u11j~ot. to ~rt~u t:'<$UUlO.t.i0n t.o til~ a. $e-(ato~~nt with 
tl:io Si1l'Hlt\latt\r'/ of! lt~t~ di~clo!l)in9 tho 1n~r«al$t or rclatioti• 
~~lp i~ivolv~d. Thl~ •t.at.~1mttrt., hO'~V~t, Wll\$ ~o be can!1.df.t;t.\'"' 
ti41.l s.ut4 AYdlabl~ only to ~uthorf.tl!'u11 hav1nt' th~ poft.: of 
nl'l.av.lll of any ~Ublic otf1cla1 and •to •~«U~$ Qf the l'll\91.f!• 
latutJJ. 03: ~"I 1~91al1Ltt• o-or.1rJd.tto·~ Vhf.ch r.'.'.&)~ b$ 0~9iutt;is11d 
ltt. ap,•a.t~ tlu~t keoi;J.ng- rtu~ll into:rMtt.om prtvatllt is int~n®<.l: 
t.o !'lftA~fUh ttH"JtJQ \tho f!mAl: truat t.h.$ l:C'IMlati~ of' #UCh in• 
to~tten would b• .an i.nvastlon of pr1va~:#· 
ln t.nie t'\l11peot. 1t. it.t GA tnterest.in9 •ppro.aeh, alth®'\fb 
t.hla i~roposal vaa dGfe.atf;l\11 becaW!lc thero were nu.•roiua quos ... 
rtton• OiL'l tll• pa:£\ of ~t•t. 1tati•14'tiortJ 1n h4iflUt4 ~ tho 
~3:tb£.d., tau., 7. 
44~pon1 ~inn., l2. (A publJ.ott.y •Y•t.aa cU.f.1. AOt b~ 
put o!' ~~. r..t.t.vu, 1tiO, u.41, •1t®11o Off.lee••·•> 
4SMinn. La¥l!Dt lt,o, c.41, Seo.,. I, ta::., 11. 
.availa.l:lility o! such information to ttrJe~'?he.rf; uf ~,un le9iula~ 
turo • .,-4fi :tn vi~w of t.bo general c<.,nfi~ential nature .of the 
roport1ng proccdurQ, it. would bttt Wli:lll to insure t..."lat r;uch 
i:nfo~tion i.:; availai~le only to n high<:{r iildr~ird.$trativo 
authority or t.o t..'le leg1itlat1vf.tl cotltd.t.tae, oonet!rned wit.h 
b:raill.Cht.aa of tJ1a cod$. This ~rould aseur('! tmblic officials 
th2tt publicJ.zin9' $UCh lnf'orn"1tion would oootut only from 
in\t'lirics into bti<:hneh~~ of the aodo and not bt1) rootivated 
principally f:roxn rrd.aehief, wlflich unfortuno.taly is not incon ... 
"~1 vable. 41 
11·· I f _ tl jMf.., ) 1 ' 
SovoJ:al emiQJ.ustcmo ocnccu:n1n9 exiat.i.n9 •Pl.•ro.c~a• t:o 
CQt~#lict Qf inte;,:ea~ •Y bo draw from this Gelecti.on of 
le9:.i.slatiw solutions and propQsod legie·lation at the ruatJ.cmal 
mui •t.ate level$. 'f'be fint. u tho CO"'!;tlexity of the proble• 
of ufi1d.n9 ocmflJ.ct cituatio.n• dequat"lf t.o ac:hievlii pro-
wction for both tbs pu.blio and thff pu.l;)lio official. 'l'hls 
iUlS reaul:tud tr• 9¢lneaTa1 dtuscrd.ption• of unac08ptab1• Jl9.h-.v1or 
witll the aireu»Wtanoes of .indi.vitlual violations to b$ invea• 
tigat.ad u tboy oocnu:.1 At.w~tli have bu@n raa<J.e to <ktfia:1•. 
unacoe:ptabla bta.bavior ~ut. tb~y haw not been aucceaatul to.: 
All ~itua:tiona. 2 . le woul.4 sum tiiat s\lcb a genei:a.l approach 
to conflict ot 1nte~ct aolut.1cne Ls ~-~ bocauaa r:ttatutoey 
linitation.u cannot bo d::•tt.e4 to cover: evory .kind of! conflict. 
•1t\lat1on. ~a a.t~proacll. pr~aentl.y ta.t•n t.o re.~y aonflio~ 
lldo.tu•Uons inWlVt\!11 dest.gnating t.lio ~l(larJ..y unda•itabla 
ait.u.atioM u crizd.nal and thosG difficult to define are 
f:illl '.t.j' lidos· I .. • .• 
lr!.i;Jcnberq, •confltot oi In.tere1t,• 699. 
2ocn:aqlas, S~h~~.s, tn ,i9~rnnent, 96. 
typically designated as improper aad remedied t!n:ough non ... 
"ird.nal co4G of ~i:hica sanctions. 
A. Federal t.agis.latJ.oo 
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At t.be federal. level of ~ove~rilent aonfliet of interest 
.stat.u.tos arc fairly clear for such overt situa.ttona as theft.* 
br.Ul1u.ry, f'raud and embaazl.ament. sanctions for such v.to1atz1ona 
include l:mpl:i:scmment or fines tb.at =ay be au uch 11.a s10,ooo. 3 
ffow·wu~·, tb1tae atatute~ apply pritiar.lly only to sorviaas of 
f)Xec:utiW;t (mm) or indopcnd~t. aqo:'lcuui f.ll'.ld not. to those of 
the courtt1 {ldlJ) or Congntsa (NiL) • Federal .interest in 
~a,tlli:fication of t11$ st.atutea &aalin; with th~ courts and 
Cotlgntss ha$ not re$ulted in significa.--.t. additional legisla-
tion d;•ttt!lpite it.lte10st in.t1'1Jmerable proporials. 4 
Up to n01# tbim. wx-ite~ has pre$t!t'l.ted. primarily .material 
gli.th~red from previoua ~tudies conduot;ed in t.hc conflict of 
intet:est ~~lL. naab of un has a dJ.ffercnt v!w of the 
effeetiv®n~s• of conflict. l.egislatior'- Each of uu also ha• a 
dif ffal!'ont re1U(~dy for monietb.tng that. mat b1il uonsi&.'lred a con-
flict situation.., £~y viown a:r~ t.cmr~~red by a thorou9'h reacU.1u1 
in. tb~ conflict area and should be oon~idf?:zo0d M sir~.JlY one 
~~1rsp@ctive to uotifl of the oonflict rc$pcm,s~s. 
3tt~~h!U1X v •. U;Bi~.~~ &~att.?!J.1 324 u.s. 4!i 1 68 (194·5) • 
"£9.lltr~u•s.1~~~ .. Sf!.artarlt ~\~aa, 71. 
At. the federal level of 9ovort1xit"1nt tbls writ~u: would. 
~n.ig)las t. that. the i~g;enui t.y of tha puhlie official has l?rogr•ius• 
ea b&yond the statuatory re3ponae:ai to confli<;rt. of iiltertiu~t 
~!tu.at.ions. t«lst. fed~ral conflict: of i,nterost. st~tu,t<lls at"n 
uaofal o:ily to ti.i'1>e limits of theiit purpoao (i.e.• overyt1-
~rou \ttrit.c so~t.h.ing on ~:iape.r tr1ere ar~ two ways to avoid it.) 
1\ cl.~v~u: fed~r!lll officiit\l 1$ quit(lJ. e\\lsily able to cl;-cumv~.u:1.t 
tlae *•L~i.rit.9 of tho C011fli.ct ~tatute and still 11ot. ~o beyoi14 
t.b.i.l limi:tr.t of what mt\lf be coosiu~red a breach of ethics. 5 
TIP tho d4l'MJree tb."t such a c:i::eumvent:.ion is possiblli it, if.'! 
na~st'Hlt'Y to rav1$e or at le,ais;t ~K~nd pr~s'l'Jnt conflict 
$Utute~ll. G 
Thu.ta tbi,a autbQr woul~ eu99fll$t t.ha.t Con9rtass 1:0-avalu-
ate t.b.ifl plm,u~nt. conflict ut.atu~s. O>tVJ%'fU.Ui sbould try to 
ram.ave t...~e poaeibility of $tatutor1 oircwuvantion through 
t~:te onact.~ut. of - clearly stated, oonf l!ct of intattef.lt st~t.ute1. 
suob a atatute could lnclu~ oomo kind of t>ublio disol.cu.iur0 
tr.: 
.. t~10 B-.J. s.U~uat.ion (Chapte:: llt• footnote 29) •u99t1u1ts 
t..~e pos$1bi11ty of such. a circumv.nt.ioA •l•o happe1d.n9 at tllo 
$tl.\t.~ l$Vf.lll-. 
6zt W<>Uld b~ a n0ver ending tatJ>~ ·to· dl$cove.r tho a.on• 
vtct.i.on rate for conflict situations. that have COM b$for~ judicial ~viaw at. both the national and •tat.• l\t!\Vel$ ot 
g:ove~nt. Moflt. tso~eea J.nd1cat.e th~t the pr:ese.nt.. oonvic::tion 
2!'ate 13 rathar small. 1?bitt ~1d ~tm that th• ecow.t•d 1• 
a1tb~r innocent or di•miaallld duo to insuffici~u-.t ev.idenco for 
convJ.otton. M111~tt, ~vern11eri~ and Pel.to M1niniatt:atitm • 
th• ·••t for nes •.onmib!c·.ao've~ni, 'jn;·" · · .................. . 
•11 - ,.;Q ·- .... _ .. l .1' 1' ..i:?_. - ........... db.I 111•' . 
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alause wbereby inf ormat.ion would be made available to public 
representatives. It is hoped that such a conflict of in-
terest statue would be reviewed periodically by Con9reps 
and would be changed iiQ. needed. There are no •perfect• 
solutions to conf liot of interest. Hopefully a. re-examination 
of present statutes and a periodic review of statutes will 
decrease t.he temptation to be involved in certain kinds of 
situations. 
'l'bere seems to be a current trend to non-statutory 
responses to possible conflict situations. Such public in-
terest groups as Ralph Nader committees alld Common Cause 
attempt to present an economic profile of legislators at the 
_national level of government. 7 'rhese profiles could serve 
as a basis for elect.roal Cleoisions. 8 However, these public 
interest groups have not yet undertaken a complete examina• 
tion of appointed national and state administrators. 
B. State Legislation 
Althouqh all fifty states have not been examined for 
this conflict of interest prosEm.tation some qaneral conclu-, 
sions can be made from the info~tion presented. 9 First, it 
7see Chapter IV, Footnote 12. Other approaches suoh as 
publ1o campaign financing have also been initiated. Watzman, 
Conflict of Interest, 176. 
8irhis, of course, is the ultimate go~l. It may however, 
be aided indirectly through editorial coznment or interest group 
membersbip reaction. · 
9This author'$ home state of Virginia has had conflict 
proposals initiated in two separate sessions of the State 
General Assembly. See footnote 29, Chapter II. 
lM~O!tL~.f.atts is ntil'~ula.t.ing th¢! emtabl.in!w~nt of bot1i~ls: to 
inv~stigat~ tb(? aJ.raun"ltan,o®~ of conflict ~lit.uationa ln order 
to clca.rly ind.i.cate th~a which arG h.ar~1ful to the public 
without jeo~:H:n:cli~ing t.he :i:oputa.tiona of p~rsons ir.u1d.\"ertont1y 
i:i:.lvolv~d i.n ~ll~g~tiotla of oonfliat of int..~r~at.. lO no$t 
aanfliot ~tudias reaogni%a the ne~d for tlepll.r.at.ia trtu1:t~n.t of 
legi$lator~J. This is manif~at~d in ~1e d~fi11ition of confli~t 
situations vi t.~ r:Jome applici.tbl¢>i t.o nll public officials and 
other!!) _just applicable t.o ngr.mey persontwil. i:lew Yo:r!t indicate• 
~:.r:of i ta?;) ls direction by it:s use of set para ta l~qi!"Slati ve ~n· 
fore~roont agenci~s.11 
LQ)g1al11tion C)\ltlinbi.9 tha use of •.tnfluenoo" by a 
leqiolator- doos not •eem p:a.ctiaable. Codes of ~,thics ar@ 
h$J.ug U$ed !not"an$ingly ms tool~ to r0spond to i)art!cular 
situationfl as they duv~lop. Publicity· ham similarly bf!(l}n e;:• 
ploXtad as a tool for m.11~tinq this kind of problem. Invest! ... 
it,.~at:iw l:eport.ing by the n~ws riw*dia s~mnlS 'to ho inor1~u\sin9 
and morfl and nor& Lntomation i• ~coming availabl• to the 
pu.blio. lnatit.utionaliZled publicitl' deviclf)s could be t;rtlatly 
nt4cd by publicity oampaiqns auch u that. wag~d by tho Coman 
Cause orgMization. 
I If' 1 -~ i t SJ • - ....... 
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Finally, it is also clear that. conflict of interest 
policy has mainly been initiated .in response to specific 
conflict situations.12 Post facto laws typically deal only 
witll "closing the :barn door after the horse has run away." 
Studies in the conflict area indicate that this is the least 
effective way of dealing with conflict of interest policy. 13 
However, this seems to be the present course of the national 
govemment and th.a state governments., 
12watzman, Conflict.of Interest., 168. 
13Percy, "The Crisis of Publio Trust," 14. 
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